Model G20 Summit 2027

STUDY GUIDE

Hosted at FLAME University, Pune · 18 to 20 June 2027

Arrive by the evening of Thursday 17 June, leave Monday 21 June



Sherpa track

Agriculture

Keeping food and fertiliser moving during wars and trade disputes.

AT A GLANCE

645 million

People who faced hunger in 2025, 7.8% of the world[1]

Close to zero

Fertiliser shipments out of the Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz, February to July 2026, the WTO reported[2]

Over US$850

Price of a tonne of urea fertiliser in April 2026, up 80% since February (World Bank); US$453 in June (WTO)[2,3]

YOUR GROUP MUST DECIDE

1. When a government may limit food or fertiliser exports, and for how long
2. Whether food aid is always exempt from export bans
3. What counts as using food as a weapon
4. Who pays to keep fertiliser affordable for poorer farmers
5. Who reports progress, and by when

FIVE TERMS TO KNOW

Export restriction
A government rule that limits or bans selling a good abroad.

Food insecurity
Not having reliable access to enough safe, nutritious food.

AMIS
The Agricultural Market Information System, which the G20 decided in 2011 to launch and house in FAO[4].

Weaponization of food
Targeted government actions that slow, stop, block or direct trade in food or farm inputs to extract unrelated geopolitical concessions by coercion[5].

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1. FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. "UN report: Global hunger levels ease for third consecutive year as regional disparities persist" (The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2026), FAO news release, Rome, 21 July 2026. 2. WTO Secretariat. "Fertilizer trade impacted by Strait of Hormuz conflict", WTO Data Blog, 10 July 2026. 3. World Bank. "Fertilizer prices surge as Strait of Hormuz disruptions tighten supplies", Data Blog, 14 May 2026. 4. FAO Committee on Commodity Problems, 69th session. "Inter-agency food and agricultural price volatility report for the G20" (CCP 12/2), April 2012. 5. G20 Trade Ministers' Statement on the Weaponization of Food through Coercive Trade Actions, Milwaukee, 30 September and 1 October 2026, published by the US Trade Representative. · Last updated 21 November 2026. Every figure is footnoted to its source.

ONE YOUNG INDIA
ORGANISER

FLAME UNIVERSITY
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AFS Intercultural Programs India
PROGRAMME PARTNER

SECTION 1

Letter from the chairs

Dear delegates,

We will chair the Agriculture Working Group at the Model G20 Summit 2027. Our group takes on one hard task: keeping food and fertiliser moving during wars and trade disputes.

Read this guide twice. The first time, read for the story of how a war far away or a ban by one seller can empty a market on the other side of the world. The second time, read it as your member's negotiator and mark every line that helps or hurts your case.

In the room we will look for clauses that name who acts, what they do and by when. We will also look for delegates who bring an exporter and an importer to the same text, and who can show a source for every claim they make.

Bring your white paper, your member's row from Section 8 and one draft clause. We look forward to meeting you at FLAME University in June.

Warm regards,

Your chairs, Agriculture Working Group

SECTION 2

How the G20 and this simulation work

The real G20

The Group of Twenty has 21 members: 19 countries and two regional bodies, the European Union and the African Union[6]. The African Union became a permanent member at the New Delhi summit in 2023[6]. Together the members account for around 85% of the world's economic output, over 75% of world trade and about two-thirds of its people[6].

The G20 began in 1999, after the Asian financial crisis, as a meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors[6]. Leaders first met in Washington DC in 2008, and they have met every year since 2011[6]. Each year one member holds the presidency and sets the agenda, helped by the members that held it before and will hold it after. These three are called the troika[6]. The United States took over the presidency on 1 December 2025 and cut the number of working groups from 16 to four[6]. The United Kingdom holds the presidency in 2027 and will host the Leaders' Summit in Manchester on 27 and 28 November 2027[7,8].

Two tracks

The G20 process is led by the sherpas, each leader's personal representative. The work runs in two tracks, the Finance Track and the Sherpa Track. Within the two tracks, working groups bring together officials from the members, invited countries and international organisations[6].

Agreement by everyone

In 2025 the G20 agriculture ministers issued an Outcome Document and Chair's Summary[9]. It records that the majority of members agreed with the text the presidency proposed, but some had challenges agreeing on one of its priorities[9]. In this simulation a text is agreed only when no member objects; the

Rules of Procedure 2027 explain how.

This simulation

The Model G20 Summit 2027 is set in 2027, the year the United Kingdom holds the G20 presidency. The Model G20 secretariat chairs every working group, and the UK delegation is an ordinary member. All 21 members are seated in every group. Each group also has four invited seats for international organisations or guest countries; they take part in the debate but are not members. Model G20 is organised by One Young India and is independent of the G20 and of every G20 government.

Each working group is modelled on a group that has met in the real G20 in recent years, so delegates learn how the forum works. Your group negotiates one short text on its agenda. On Sunday afternoon the working groups' texts come together in the communiqué, which the Leaders' Session adopts by consensus at the closing ceremony. The Rules of Procedure 2027 explain how debate, amendments and the final text work.

This working group

The Agriculture Working Group is modelled on the work of the G20's agriculture ministers. They met in Hyderabad, India, in June 2023[10], in Mato Grosso, Brazil, in September 2024[11], and again under South Africa's presidency in 2025, when their text acknowledged the work of a new Food Security Task Force[9]. In 2026, under the US presidency, G20 trade ministers reached consensus on a statement against using food as a weapon, the US Trade Representative announced as chair[12,13], and finance ministers urged countries to avoid unnecessary export restrictions[14].

SECTION 3

The issue explained


Why food and fertiliser cross borders

Many countries cannot grow all their own food or make their own fertiliser. FAO expects Egypt to need 12 million tonnes of imported wheat in 2026 to 2027[15]. Japan's agriculture ministry reported for 2022 that almost all its ammonium phosphate and potassium chloride, and 95% of its urea, were imported from a small number of countries[16]. South Africa imports more than 80% of the fertiliser it needs[17].

Food, fuel and fertiliser markets are linked[18]. Nitrogen fertilisers such as urea depend on energy, because making ammonia uses natural gas both as a raw material and as fuel[2]. Timing matters too: fertiliser must be applied at specific moments in the crop cycle, and if it does not arrive on time, yields are reduced, FAO warned[19]. Figure 1 shows what stops the flow and what keeps it moving.

FIGURE 1 SECTION 3

How food and fertiliser move from exporters to importers, what stops them, and four ways to keep them moving.



How a war stops the flow

In 2022 the war in Ukraine[18] blocked Ukraine's sea exports of food until the Black Sea Grain Initiative, from 22 July, let ships leave three Ukrainian ports[20]. In 2026 a conflict in the Persian Gulf brought fertiliser shipments through the Strait of Hormuz to a standstill[2]. The strait carries around a quarter of the world's seaborne oil, as well as large volumes of gas and fertiliser[21]. In March 2026 the WTO said around one-third of the world's fertiliser exports normally pass through it[22], and Germany's government puts the share at 17% to 24%[23]. After the conflict began, traffic through the strait fell from 138 commercial ships a day to almost zero[22]. In April 2026 the price of urea rose from around US$400 to over US$850 a tonne, before falling back to US$453 in June[2]. In July the WTO mentioned an agreement to reopen trade in the strait[2].

How a ban or a dispute stops the flow

Governments may limit their exports of food for a time to relieve a critical shortage at home. Many food-importing countries worry about what that does to prices and price swings elsewhere, especially in poor countries[24]. In July 2022 around 25 countries had adopted export restrictions affecting over 8% of global food trade[18]. In 2026 China, Russia and Türkiye all tightened controls on fertiliser or its inputs[2]. The WTO counts 47 export measures in force that affect fertilisers, most of them licensing rules from before the conflict[2].

Some trade actions go further. G20 trade ministers call it the weaponization of food when governments slow, stop, block or direct the trade of food or farm inputs to put coercive pressure on another country for unrelated political gains[5]. Their statement does not cover measures that are transparent, respect international rules and serve legitimate domestic policy aims, such as food security[5].

Why prices matter as much as supplies

Hunger can rise even when the world grows enough food. South Africa's 2025 G20 presidency noted that recent rises in hunger came while there was no global shortage of food, and were caused by price shocks that drove up food prices[25]. In June 2026 the G7 and partner countries said the fertiliser problem was mainly one of affordability and money, not a shortage of supplies[26]. In 2025, 645 million people faced hunger, and Africa had more hungry people than Asia[1].

SECTION 4

What has happened so far

Jun 2011	G20 agriculture ministers meet in Paris; the G20 decides to launch AMIS[4]
Jan 2021	Nearly 80 WTO members pledge not to restrict exports of food bought by WFP for humanitarian aid[24]
5 Mar 2022	AMIS holds an emergency session on the conflict in Ukraine, its first[10]
13 May 2022	India restricts wheat exports[27]
Jun 2022	WTO ministers exempt WFP's humanitarian food purchases from export bans[28]
22 Jul 2022	The Black Sea Grain Initiative starts, for 120 days at first[20]
17 Jul 2023	The Black Sea Initiative ends after Russia's decision to terminate it[29]
20 Jul 2023	India bans exports of non-basmati white rice[30]
Feb 2026	Conflict in the Persian Gulf; fertiliser shipments through the Strait of Hormuz stop[2]
Apr 2026	Urea rises from around US$400 to over US$850 a tonne[2]
21 Jul 2026	A UN report projects 510 to 520 million people may still face hunger in 2030[1]
1 Sep 2026	G20 finance ministers, in a Chair's Statement, urge countries to avoid unnecessary export restrictions[14]
1 Oct 2026	G20 trade ministers reach consensus on a statement against the weaponization of food, says the US Trade Representative as chair[12,13]
28 Oct 2026	The World Bank projects food prices up about 10% in 2026 and fertiliser prices up 14%[31]

What the G20 has already said

G20 agriculture ministers, Declaration agreed under Brazil's presidency, September 2024, paragraph 20:

> *"Besides not imposing export prohibitions or restrictions in a manner inconsistent with relevant WTO provisions, concrete steps should be taken to ensure agricultural and food products trade to flow."*[11]

G20 trade ministers, Statement on the Weaponization of Food through Coercive Trade Actions, Milwaukee, October 2026:

> *"We condemn food weaponization, as it poses a significant humanitarian and economic threat."*[5]

SECTION 5

Facts that matter

FIGURE	VALUE	YEAR	REF.
People facing hunger	about 645 million, 7.8% of the world	2025	1
People facing moderate or severe food insecurity	around 2.1 billion, 25.8% of the world	2025	1
Hungry people in Africa and in Asia	about 309 million and 292 million	2025	1
People in acute food insecurity, WFP count	318 million; almost 45 million more if the conflict went past mid-2026 with oil above US$100 a barrel	March 2026	32
FAO Food Price Index	133.9 points: 5.9% above a year earlier, 16.4% below the March 2022 peak	October 2026	33
Urea price	over US$850 a tonne in April, up 80% since February (World Bank); US$453 in June (WTO)	2026	2,3
Gulf economies' share of world nitrogen fertiliser exports	24.8%	WTO, 2024 data	2
World fertiliser exports that export licences, restrictions and bans could affect	up to 15%; at most 23.3% if all Gulf exports count as blocked by the closed strait	WTO, 2026	2
Export measures in force affecting fertilisers	47	WTO, 2026	2
Ships through the Strait of Hormuz each day	138, falling to almost zero	WTO, March 2026	22
Countries with food export restrictions	around 25, covering over 8% of food trade	July 2022	18
Food shipped under the Black Sea Grain Initiative	about 32 million tonnes, to 45 countries	2022 to 2023	20

SECTION 6

Core tensions

Feed your own people first, or keep exports flowing

For your own people first. A government answers to its own citizens. India said it restricted wheat exports in May 2022 to manage its own food security and to help neighbouring and vulnerable countries that could not get enough wheat[27]. When it banned exports of one kind of rice in 2023, it said retail rice prices at home had risen 11.5% in a year[30].

For keeping exports flowing. Many food-importing countries worry that export limits can push up prices and price swings elsewhere, especially in poor countries[24]. G20 agriculture ministers said in 2024 that, besides not imposing export bans inconsistent with WTO rules, concrete steps should be taken to keep food trade flowing[11].

Condemn coercion, or protect room to act

For condemning coercion. G20 trade ministers in 2026 condemned food weaponization as "a significant humanitarian and economic threat"[5]. The US Trade Representative said that for decades trade in food and farm inputs has been used to put coercive pressure on countries[12].

For room to act. The same statement does not cover transparent measures that respect international rules and serve legitimate domestic policy aims, including food security[5]. Members will disagree about where a fair emergency measure ends and coercion begins, and the statement names no one to decide.

Rescue now, or resilience later

For rescue now. When a strait closes, farmers need fertiliser this season. The G7's June 2026 plan starts with an immediate response and financial stabilisation[26], and the EU proposed a top-up of €300 million to its agricultural reserve to help farmers facing fertiliser costs[34].

For resilience later. Countries that depend on a few suppliers stay exposed. The EU wants to reinforce its own fertiliser production and reduce its dependency on imports[35], and Japan's agriculture ministry, after the 2022 price spike, named a stockpile of fertiliser raw materials and more use of fertiliser from domestic resources[16]. Canada, the world's largest potash exporter, promoted open agri-food trade and efficient use of fertiliser in June 2026[36,37].

SECTION 7

Case studies

The Black Sea Grain Initiative

In July 2022 Türkiye and the UN brokered a package: the Black Sea Grain Initiative and a memorandum between Russia and the UN Secretariat[10]. A Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul, staffed by Russia, Türkiye, Ukraine and the UN, ran the deal[20]. About 32 million tonnes of food left three Ukrainian ports for 45 countries[20]. WFP moved more than 725,000 tonnes of wheat under it to Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen[20]. The deal was renewed for 120 days, then twice for 60 days, the length Russia agreed to[20], and it ended on 17 July 2023 after Russia decided to terminate it[29]. The UN Secretary-General called the initiative and the memorandum with Russia "a lifeline for global food security and a beacon of hope in a troubled world"[29].

What it shows. A corridor can move food through a war, but only while every party keeps agreeing to it. **Question for your group.** What would a G20 text need to say to make the next corridor last longer?

India's wheat and rice restrictions

On 13 May 2022 India restricted wheat exports[27], saying it needed to manage its own food security and support neighbouring and vulnerable countries[27]. After a request from Egypt's government, it let a cargo of 61,500 tonnes of wheat sail to Egypt[27]. In September 2022 India put a 20% duty on exports of non-basmati white rice, and on 20 July 2023 it banned them[30]. It said retail rice prices had risen 11.5% over a year, and that this rice made up about 25% of its rice exports[30].

What it shows. A large exporter can protect its own consumers and still make exceptions for countries that ask[27]. **Question for your group.** Should a G20 text set rules for export limits, such as notice, a time limit or exceptions for the poorest importers?

Fertiliser shocks, 2022 and 2026

In 2021 and 2022 fertiliser prices rose by more than 100% and 55%, amid supply disruptions in Russia and Belarus[3]. In 2022 urea briefly passed US$900 a tonne[2]. In 2026 the Gulf conflict closed the Strait of Hormuz to fertiliser shipments[2]. Several members tightened their own controls: China on urea and sulphuric acid, Russia on fertiliser export quotas, and Türkiye on sulphur[2]. Some moved the other way, Türkiye among them: the EU suspended fertiliser import tariffs, except on goods from Russia and Belarus, and Türkiye lifted duties on urea and other fertilisers[2].

What it shows. In the same crisis, members restricted some exports and opened up some imports, and Türkiye did both. **Question for your group.** What can the G20 ask of members that export fertiliser when supplies are tight?

SECTION 8

Country positions

One row for each of the 21 members. "Stake" and "On the record" come from official sources. "Our reading", in italics, is what we think that record suggests: test it in your research. Where the record is silent, the row says so. The label under each name shows what the record says about the member's trade in food or fertiliser: food exporter, palm oil exporter, fertiliser exporter, fertiliser importer, fertiliser exports and imports, regional body, or not clear. Bring this section to the summit and tick each row as members speak.

MEMBER	STAKE	ON THE RECORD	OUR READING	MARK
Argentina NOT CLEAR	In October 2026 FAO linked lower world wheat prices partly to a better production outlook in Argentina[33].	Its foreign ministry reports that its then foreign minister, Diana Mondino, told G20 trade ministers in Brasília that such farm subsidies "promueven la ineficiencia y obstaculizan nuestros esfuerzos hacia la seguridad alimentaria" (they promote inefficiency and hinder our efforts towards food security)[38].	***Pushes for:*** *Fewer farm subsidies.* ***Allies:*** *Australia, Canada.* *Not clear from the record: red line. Research it.*	☐ Ally ☐ Opp. ☐ Swing
Australia NOT CLEAR	In October 2026 FAO said good crop prospects in Australia put further downward pressure on barley prices[33].	In May 2026, with the United States, Paraguay and Ukraine, it argued at the WTO that India's price support for rice and wheat is well above the levels India has notified[39].	***Pushes for:*** *Holding members to WTO limits on farm support.* ***Allies:*** *The United States, Argentina.* *Not clear from the record: red line. Research it.*	☐ Ally ☐ Opp. ☐ Swing

MEMBER	STAKE	ON THE RECORD	OUR READING	MARK
Brazil NOT CLEAR	Its ministries co-chaired the G20 agriculture ministers' meeting of September 2024[11].	The 2024 Declaration, agreed under its presidency, encourages "facilitating international trade and access to affordable, safe, and sustainable fertilizers"[11]. In 2026 it joined the G7's action plan on fertiliser shocks as a partner country[26].	***Pushes for:*** *Affordable fertiliser through open trade.* ***Allies:*** *India, Korea.* *Not clear from the record: red line. Research it.*	☐ Ally ☐ Opp. ☐ Swing
Canada FERTILISER EXPORTS AND IMPORTS	Its government says Canada is the world's largest producer and exporter of potash, and a net exporter of nitrogen fertilisers, but that it relies largely on imports of phosphorus fertilisers[36].	In June 2026 its agriculture minister said he had promoted the efficient use of fertiliser and open agri-food trade[37].	***Pushes for:*** *Open trade in fertiliser.* ***Allies:*** *Australia, the European Union.* *Not clear from the record: red line. Research it.*	☐ Ally ☐ Opp. ☐ Swing
China FERTILISER EXPORTER	In 2026 it tightened controls on urea and sulphuric acid before allowing limited urea exports under a quota, the WTO reports[2].	It objected to four paragraphs of the 2026 finance ministers' Chair's Statement, including paragraph 4 on wars and conflicts, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and value chains such as energy, food, fertiliser and critical minerals; no reason is given[14]. In 2023 it said the agriculture ministers' outcome should not refer to the Ukraine crisis[10].	***Pushes for:*** *Room to control its own exports.* ***Red line:*** *A text that names a conflict.* ***Allies:*** *Russia.*	☐ Ally ☐ Opp. ☐ Swing
France NOT CLEAR	It held the G7 presidency in 2026[40], and the G7's June 2026 action plan on fertiliser shocks appeared on its G7 website[26].	After the G7 agriculture ministers met in Paris in October 2026, its agriculture minister said the G7 was "determined to support our farmers"[40].	***Pushes for:*** *Support for farmers facing fertiliser costs.* ***Allies:*** *The European Union, Germany, Italy.* *Not clear from the record: red line. Research it.*	☐ Ally ☐ Opp. ☐ Swing
Germany NOT CLEAR	Its government told the Bundestag that 17% to 24% of the world's fertiliser exports usually pass through the Strait of Hormuz[23].	The same answer relays WFP's warning that high transport costs could leave it able to reach up to nine million fewer people in 2026 than planned[23].	***Pushes for:*** *Humanitarian food reaching those in need.* ***Allies:*** *France, the European Union.* *Not clear from the record: red line. Research it.*	☐ Ally ☐ Opp. ☐ Swing
India FOOD EXPORTER	In May 2022 it restricted wheat exports, and in July 2023 it banned exports of non-basmati white rice[27,30].	It said the wheat restriction was to manage its own food security and to support neighbouring and vulnerable countries[27]. At the WTO in May 2026 it defended its rice and wheat support as necessary for food security[39].	***Pushes for:*** *Room to restrict exports when prices at home rise.* ***Allies:*** *Brazil, Korea.* *Not clear from the record: red line. Research it.*	☐ Ally ☐ Opp. ☐ Swing
Indonesia PALM OIL EXPORTER	Japan's agriculture ministry lists Indonesia's export control on palm oil in April to May 2022 among major developments abroad in 2022[16].	No public statement found. Research it.	*Not clear from the record. Research it.*	☐ Ally ☐ Opp. ☐ Swing
Italy NOT CLEAR	In May 2026 its foreign minister co-chaired a meeting in Rome that launched the "Rome Coalition" on access to fertilisers and food security[41], bringing together over 40 countries and organisations[19].	Its foreign ministry says the coalition aims at continuity of supply flows, better access to fertilisers and more resilient food systems[41].	***Pushes for:*** *Steady supply of fertiliser around the Mediterranean.* ***Allies:*** *France, the European Union.* *Not clear from the record: red line. Research it.*	☐ Ally ☐ Opp. ☐ Swing

MEMBER	STAKE	ON THE RECORD	OUR READING	MARK
Japan FERTILISER IMPORTER	Its agriculture ministry's report for 2022 said almost all its ammonium phosphate and potassium chloride, and 95% of its urea, were imported from a small number of countries[16].	In the same report it named a stockpile of fertiliser raw materials and more use of fertiliser from domestic resources as ways to keep supplies stable[16].	***Pushes for:*** *Stockpiles and more varied suppliers.* ***Allies:*** *South Africa, the European Union.* *Not clear from the record: red line. Research it.*	☐ Ally ☐ Opp. ☐ Swing
Republic of Korea NOT CLEAR	In June 2026 it joined the G7's action plan on fertiliser shocks as a partner country[26].	No public statement found. Research it.	***Allies:*** *Brazil, India.* *Not clear from the record: pushes for, red line. Research it.*	☐ Ally ☐ Opp. ☐ Swing
Mexico NOT CLEAR	A ministry leaflet says its fertiliser programme will make chemical and organic fertilisers available to small producers of maize, beans and rice[42].	After AMIS's emergency session of 5 March 2022, it issued a joint statement as AMIS's outgoing chair with the incoming chair, the United States[10].	***Pushes for:*** *Shared early warning through AMIS.* ***Allies:*** *The United States.* *Not clear from the record: red line. Research it.*	☐ Ally ☐ Opp. ☐ Swing
Russia FERTILISER EXPORTER	The World Bank calls Russia and Belarus two of the world's key fertiliser suppliers[3]. In 2026 Russia extended its fertiliser export quotas and suspended export licences for ammonium nitrate[2].	It dissociated itself from three paragraphs of the 2023 G20 agriculture ministers' Chair's Summary, including paragraph 5 on the Black Sea Grain Initiative[10].	***Red line:*** *A text that names a conflict.* ***Allies:*** *China.* *Not clear from the record: pushes for. Research it.*	☐ Ally ☐ Opp. ☐ Swing
Saudi Arabia FERTILISER EXPORTER	The WTO counts it among the Gulf economies that export fertiliser; some Saudi shipments continued through the Red Sea port of Yanbu, at higher cost[2].	No public statement found. Research it.	*Not clear from the record. Research it.*	☐ Ally ☐ Opp. ☐ Swing
South Africa FERTILISER IMPORTER	Its agriculture minister says it imports more than 80% of its fertiliser, and that fertiliser is around 35% to 50% of a farmer's costs[17].	Under its 2025 presidency the G20 set up a Food Security Task Force; the agriculture ministers' 2025 Outcome Document and Chair's Summary acknowledges its work[9].	***Pushes for:*** *Affordable fertiliser for importing countries.* ***Allies:*** *The African Union, the European Union.* *Not clear from the record: red line. Research it.*	☐ Ally ☐ Opp. ☐ Swing
Türkiye FERTILISER EXPORTS AND IMPORTS	In 2026 it banned sulphur exports for a time and lifted duties on urea and other fertilisers[2].	With the UN, it brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2022, and the centre that ran it sat in Istanbul[10,20].	***Pushes for:*** *Negotiated corridors.* *Not clear from the record: red line, allies. Research it.*	☐ Ally ☐ Opp. ☐ Swing
United Kingdom NOT CLEAR	It holds the G20 presidency in 2027[7].	In July 2023 it condemned "in the strongest terms" Russia's decision to withdraw from the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which it said had delivered over 32 million tonnes of food[43].	***Pushes for:*** *Corridors that last.* ***Allies:*** *Türkiye.* *Not clear from the record: red line. Research it.*	☐ Ally ☐ Opp. ☐ Swing
United States NOT CLEAR	It held the G20 presidency in 2026[6]; the finance ministers' Chair's Statement urged countries to avoid unnecessary export restrictions[14].	Its Trade Representative said food and farm inputs have been used for decades to put coercive pressure on countries, and called the G20 statement on the weaponization of food "an important step"[12].	***Pushes for:*** *A firm line against coercion with food.* ***Allies:*** *Australia, Mexico.* *Not clear from the record: red line. Research it.*	☐ Ally ☐ Opp. ☐ Swing

MEMBER	STAKE	ON THE RECORD	OUR READING	MARK
European Union FERTILISER IMPORTER	In May 2026 the European Commission proposed a Fertiliser Action Plan to reinforce its own production and reduce its dependency on imports[35].	It aimed to mobilise €540 million to help farmers facing fertiliser costs[34], and it suspended fertiliser import tariffs, except on goods from Russia and Belarus[2].	***Pushes for:*** *Help for farmers and more varied supply.* ***Allies:*** *France, Germany, Italy.* *Not clear from the record: red line. Research it.*	☐ Ally ☐ Opp. ☐ Swing
African Union REGIONAL BODY	Africa had about 309 million hungry people in 2025, more than Asia[1].	In May 2026 its Commission called an emergency technical meeting on what the Middle East conflict meant for fertiliser supply, prices and trade in Africa[44].	***Pushes for:*** *Emergency help with fertiliser for Africa.* ***Allies:*** *South Africa.* *Not clear from the record: red line. Research it.*	☐ Ally ☐ Opp. ☐ Swing

Invited seats (not members)

FAO. Its Director-General warned in May 2026 that disruption in the Strait of Hormuz was already tightening fertiliser markets[19]; in 2011 the G20 decided to house AMIS in FAO[4].

World Food Programme. Ukraine supplied more than half of WFP's wheat grain in 2022[20].

WTO. Its database records 47 export measures in force that affect fertilisers[2].

Egypt (food-importing guest country in this simulation). FAO puts its wheat import needs for 2026 to 2027 at 12 million tonnes[15]; in 2022 it asked India to let a wheat cargo already loading at Kandla sail despite India's restriction, and India agreed[27].

The camps

Exporters that limited sales

India restricted wheat and rice[27,30]; China and Russia tightened fertiliser exports in 2026[2].

Fertiliser importers

Japan, South Africa and the EU depend on imported fertiliser[16,17,35].

Against coercion with food

The United States, whose Trade Representative chaired the ministerial and said the entire G20 reached consensus on the statement[12,13].

The G7 fertiliser plan

Brazil, India and Korea joined as partners[26]; France held the G7 presidency[40].

SECTION 9

Options on the table

Each option is something the G20 can actually do: commit its own members, call on others, or ask international bodies to act and report. Who may back or resist each option is our reading of the record in Section 8, for you to test in your research.

A. Shared early warning

What it is. Members report stocks, prices and planned export measures to one system, and meet at once when markets jump. **Who runs it.** AMIS, which the G20 decided in 2011 to house in FAO[4]. **Precedent.** The 2023 G20 text supports AMIS's work on fertilisers, and in March 2022 its Rapid Response Forum held an emergency session on the conflict in Ukraine[10]. **For.** It already exists, and the 2025 G20 agriculture text calls it "a vital instrument"[9]. **Against.** Warning of a shortage does not end it. **May back it.** Mexico and the United States, AMIS's outgoing and incoming chairs, which issued a joint statement after its March 2022 emergency session[10].

B. Food aid exempt from export bans

What it is. No member blocks food bought by WFP for humanitarian aid, in any crisis. **Who runs it.** Each member, under WTO rules. **Precedent.** In June 2022 WTO ministers exempted WFP's humanitarian food purchases from export bans[24], and the 2023 G20 text recalled that decision[10]. **For.** It protects the people with the least. **Against.** It covers only aid, not the trade most importers rely on. **May back it.** Germany, which relayed WFP's warning that high logistics costs could leave it reaching up to nine million fewer people in 2026[23].

C. Condemn coercion, protect open policies

What it is. Members commit never to use food or farm inputs as a weapon, while keeping room for open, rule-based measures. **Who runs it.** Each member, with peer review in the G20. **Precedent.** The Milwaukee statement of October 2026[5]. **For.** The US Trade Representative, as chair, said the entire G20 reached consensus on it[13]. **Against.** It names no one to decide when a measure is coercion. **May back it.** The United States[12].

D. A negotiated corridor in wartime

What it is. A safe sea route for food and fertiliser, agreed by the parties to a conflict and watched by a neutral body. **Who runs it.** The UN, a broker country and the parties to the conflict, as in 2022[20]. **Precedent.** The Black Sea Grain Initiative, brokered by Türkiye and the UN on 22 July 2022[10]. **For.** It moved about 32 million tonnes of food out of a war zone[20]. **Against.** It lasted only while every party agreed, and ended in July 2023[29]. **May back it.** Türkiye[10].

E. Money to keep fertiliser affordable

What it is. Development banks finance fertiliser production, storage and transport, and help poorer countries buy it in a crisis. **Who runs it.** The multilateral development banks. **Precedent.** In 2026 G20 finance ministers welcomed the banks' plan to develop a roadmap on strengthening fertiliser supply chains[14]. The G7's June 2026 plan adds market monitoring through AMIS and local fertiliser production[26]. **For.** It answers the problem of cost, which the G7 says is the main one[26]. **Against.** New plants and storage can take years to build. **May back it.** Brazil, India and Korea, which joined the G7 plan[26].

SECTION 10

What the communiqué must answer

1. When may a member limit its food or fertiliser exports, and for how long?
2. Is food bought for humanitarian aid always exempt?
3. What counts as using food as a weapon, and who decides?
4. How do members warn each other early about shortages and price jumps?
5. Who pays to keep fertiliser affordable for poorer farmers?
6. Who reports progress, to whom, and by when?

DRAFT PARAGRAPH, AS AMENDED — WEAK, THEN STRONG

> ~~We recognise the importance of food security and call for open and predictable trade in food and fertiliser.~~ We commit not to restrict exports of food bought by the World Food Programme for humanitarian purposes, and to notify AMIS at least 30 days before any new export restriction on food or fertiliser, with an end date. We call on the multilateral development banks to finance fertiliser supply for low-income food-importing countries, and ask FAO and AMIS to report to our Agriculture Ministers by October 2028.

WHO ACTS	WHAT	FOR WHOM	HOW LONG	WHO REPORTS
G20 members, and the development banks	*no bans on humanitarian food; notice and end dates for export limits; finance for fertiliser*	*low-income food-importing countries*	*from adoption, reported by October 2028*	*FAO and AMIS*

The weak paragraph names no one and promises nothing. The strong one commits only G20 members and calls on everyone else. It is an example, not the answer: your group may decide on a different course, or on none.

SECTION 11

Preparation

Your white paper

Write at most 1,000 words, with numbered sources, and send it to your chairs by Monday 31 May 2027 (Rules of Procedure 9.2). Use five parts:

1. Your member's stake, in three numbers with sources.
2. Its position on each question in Section 10.
3. Its red lines: what it will not accept.
4. One draft paragraph in the style of a communiqué, beginning "We commit" or "We call on".
5. Your sources, numbered, official ones first.

Five questions to research for your member

1. Does your member export or import food and fertiliser, and which ones?
2. Has it limited its own exports of food or fertiliser since 2022, and why?
3. How did the closing of the Strait of Hormuz in 2026 affect it?
4. What did its agriculture or trade minister say at the G20 or the WTO in 2026?
5. Which members are most likely to agree with it, and which one in the other camp could it win over?

Starter sources

Hunger in the world: the 2026 UN report, reference 1

The G20 statement on the weaponization of food, reference 5

Fertiliser trade after the Strait of Hormuz closed (WTO), reference 2

The 2024 G20 agriculture declaration, reference 11

What G20 finance ministers said in 2026, reference 14

The Black Sea Grain Initiative in facts and figures, reference 20

The FAO Food Price Index, reference 33

The WTO's 2022 decisions on food insecurity, reference 24

POCKET CARD

Your first hour as a delegate

- [ ] **Roll call.** Hold up your placard and answer "present" when your member is called.
- [ ] **Opening speech.** Give your member's stake in one number, its position, and one thing it wants in the text.
- [ ] **Listen.** As members speak, mark their rows in Section 8: ally, opponent or swing.
- [ ] **First caucus.** Find two allies, one in your camp and one in the other.
- [ ] **By the break.** Bring one clause that names who acts, what they do, and by when.

SECTION 12

Glossary

AMIS
The Agricultural Market Information System, which the G20 decided in 2011 to launch and house in FAO[4].

Corridor
A safe route for ships, agreed by the parties to a conflict.

Export restriction
A government rule that limits or bans selling a good abroad.

FAO
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Fertiliser
Nutrients farmers add to soil, such as nitrogen, phosphate and potash.

Food insecurity
Not having reliable access to enough safe, nutritious food.

Food Price Index
FAO's monthly measure of world prices for a basket of foods[33].

Potash
A fertiliser that supplies potassium.

Strait of Hormuz
The narrow sea passage between the Persian Gulf and the open ocean.

Urea
A nitrogen fertiliser, made from ammonia produced with natural gas[2].

Weaponization of food

Targeted government actions that slow, stop, block or direct trade in food or farm inputs to extract unrelated geopolitical concessions by coercion[5].

WFP

The World Food Programme, the UN agency that brings food aid.

WTO

The World Trade Organization, which sets the rules of trade between its members.

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