Beyond 10 Minutes: Governing India’s Emerging Instant-Service Economy

Executive Summary 

“Our eventual vision is to be below 10 minutes for every customer in India” are the words of Blinkit^[1], encapsulating the ambition of India’s rapidly expanding instant-service economy: speed. Encompassing platform-based domestic services and operating through platform networks, dark-stores, and gig labourers, this model has reshaped the function of Indian cities.

This white paper examines the benefits and challenges created by the instant-service economy across the areas of gig-worker welfare, urban strategisation and sustainability, and local retail competition. It finds that while the instant-service economy fosters flexible employment and greater consumer accessibility, it also creates vulnerabilities that existing policy is not fully equipped to address. 

The paper therefore proposes a comprehensive policy framework to integrate the instant-service economy into India’s policy architecture without compromising its blueprint. The recommendations focus on strengthening worker protections, adapting urban infrastructure to delivery activity, and empowering smaller retailers to participate in e-commerce.

Introduction

Technological advancement and proliferation have transformed communication, consumption, and commute in Indian cities. Over the past decade smartphones, online commerce, and the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) have bridged the gap of time and physical proximity between businesses and consumers. In 2013, the multinational e-commerce juggernaut, Amazon, entered the Indian market to capitalise on India’s growing internet base^[2]. Rather than stagnating, however, the platform networks have evolved to prioritise speed, revolutionising the concept of ‘quick commerce.’ 

Quick commerce refers to the digital retail model that delivers groceries, snacks, and daily items to households in the range of 10 to 30 minutes. The primary administrators of this shipment model in India are Blinkit, Zepto, and Swiggy Instamart. These corporations operate through digital networks to connect individuals and coordinate buyers and sellers. With the explosion of quick commerce during the COVID-19 Pandemic, these platform businesses have now significantly infiltrated Tier-2 and Tier-3 Indian cities, with Blinkit recording approximately 424 million orders in the FY 2024-25 (1 April 2024 to 31 March 2025), according to Eternal Ltd's annual report (p.9)^[3]. Blinkit operates in Surat, Visakhapatnam, and Bhopal as of 2026, all T2 cities^[4], highlighting the gradual extension of the model beyond Tier-1 cities. Furthermore, it now encompasses instant domestic services companies, including Snabbit and InstaHelp (Urban Company). This paper defines the instant-service economy as platform-based businesses that provide rapid delivery of goods or on-demand domestic services through digital networks.

Unlike conventional e-commerce models, instant services employ specialised apparatus, including micro-fulfilment hubs and local manpower, to ensure immediate and efficient delivery. The number of gig workers needed to carry out last-mile delivery services creates the need for formal employment conditions for workers, while frequent commute for shipment can produce dense traffic and raise environmental concerns. Lastly, the reliance on technology to connect workers and consumers necessitates the development of digital infrastructure underlying these services, while the increasing dominance of platform networks creates intensely competitive markets for local retail, impeding growth and opportunity for kirana stores.

The multi-dimensional impacts produced by the service model elucidate that quick commerce is now a service embedded in the daily lives of many urban Indians. Governance, however, does not yet reflect this interdependence, as regulation remains fragmented across policy domains. Labour policy addresses protections for gig workers, municipal planning tackles logistics and commute, and environmental law manages waste and emissions. By using this methodology, policymakers risk overlooking the intersection between these elements and therefore developing ineffective frameworks. 

This paper therefore examines: How can India adapt existing policy frameworks to address the interconnected effects of the instant-service economy while stabilising gig-worker welfare, urban strategisation and sustainability, and local retail competition? Through the confluence of these three dimensions, this paper proposes a comprehensive scheme addressing the existing policy gaps in Indian legislation. 

Approach

This paper uses a desk review of government policies, academic research, institutional reports and press coverage to examine India's instant-service economy across three areas: gig-worker welfare, urban infrastructure and local retail competitiveness. Policy documents establish the existing regulatory framework, while research and reporting analyse and highlight gaps between policy design and implementation. However, the paper does not involve primary fieldwork, and findings from individual case studies, small samples or reported incidents may not represent the wider sector. Press coverage can also emphasise specific events rather than broader industry trends. The analysis therefore uses available evidence to develop recommendations, while recognising the need for further evaluation of their effectiveness.

Pillar I – Labour & Social Protection 

NITI Aayog estimated that nearly 7.7 million workers engaged in the Indian gig-workforce in 2020-21.^[5] Graphic designers, part-time tutors, and grocery couriers are just some of the roles that exist under the broad spectrum of gig work. Under India’s Code on Social Security, 2020, ^[6] a gig worker is identified as “a person who performs work or participates in a work arrangement and earns from such activities outside of traditional employer-employee relationship.” Hence, the members of this labourforce operate on a task-to-task level, making their contracting companies more like partners than employers.

Benefits & Opportunity 

Currently, around 90% of India’s workforce engages in some form of informal employment^[7], whether that be in house help services or delivery driving. Low work-entry barriers in this sector mean that untrained individuals are provided with fairly stable sources of income along with upskill opportunities, where they acquire foundational skills such as digital literacy, navigation, and customer-related soft skills, helping empower India’s less fortunate socio-economic class.

Furthermore, businesses offering skill-specific occupations, such as Urban Company, can enable vertical mobility by transforming low-skilled workers into certified professionals in careers like technicians and beauticians. The most notable advantage of the gig-force is its flexibility and scope to provide alternative earning opportunities. Individuals can choose and adapt their working hours, while workers can take up niche gigs such as graphic designing as ‘side-hustles,’ allowing them to transform hobbies and talents into profitable endeavours and obtain supplementary income.

Moreover, the benefits of these versatile short-term gigs extend beyond workers, as they provide businesses with opportunities to operate according to demand. Due to the absence of long-term commitments towards freelancers, platform networks can simply scale their workforce according to need-based demand. For India, this is particularly beneficial as delivery platforms can hire more delivery personnel before major festivals such as Holi and Diwali, when last-minute orders increase. This scalability is evident even on a micro level; businesses can deploy more worker shifts during the early morning or evenings, when meal demands are greater. This further generates labour across logistics, warehousing, marketing, or content-creation, resulting in broader economic growth and business activity.

Challenges

Despite its perceived flexibility, however, the hidden financial risks of the gig economy are borne almost entirely by the workers. A 2024 report published by the International Labour Organization (ILO) surveyed 56 platform workers and conducted interviews with 22 of those workers.^[8] The majority of interviewees said that “they received no digital-skills training or general task-related upskilling outside of their initial onboarding procedures…” While these findings offer insight into workers' experiences, they should not be treated as representative of the millions of gig workers in the economy, given the limited sample size.

Workers hailing from lower income families may not have prior digital skills (such as platform navigation and online communication) that are prerequisites for a platform employee. Here, a lack of training could have adverse consequences. Inefficient online contact with customers during delivery can lead to delays in completion and even customer complaints being filed.

These complaints raise another fundamental obstacle for the gig-force: opaque algorithmic management. Interviewees commented that declining orders or issues with shipment can lead to a plummet in their rating performance.^[8] These rating systems can result in lower-paying project allocation, or potential suspension and removal of worker accounts. This framework is entirely governed by the network, and appeal efforts are usually futile due to ineffective redressal pipelines between business and workers. Hence, employee satisfaction is rarely maintained in such settings. 

Moreover, while work in the quick-commerce sector is considered appealing and flexible, income volatility is a crucial vulnerability that currently exists. The ILO report discovered that to reach sustainable income the interviewed gig workers worked an average of 50.7^[8] hours per week. In several instances, workers in delivery or ride-hailing services reported having to ride 90 to 120 kilometres daily to earn a decent wage.^[8] However, rising commission rates reserved by platform networks – some reaching nearly 25-30%^[8] of an individual worker’s earnings, as reported by the interviewees – significantly drain their salaries. This figure, however, reflects workers covered by the report and may not represent commission practices across the entire sector. Lastly, critical gaps in social protections for gig employees in India, which are crucial provisions for accident-prone gigs (including ride-hailing assistance) coupled with the investment the worker has to make to purchase or rent devices, vehicles, and fuel reflect the limited financial and social support from platform networks, even though the platforms take a substantial cut of workers’ earnings.^[8] 

Policy Gap 

The definition provided by India’s Code on Social Security, particularly the section “work arrangement…outside of traditional employer-employee relationship”^[6] is dubious, as this interpretation was formulated during a period where the gig-economy was evolving, meaning that any rigid boundaries could quickly be rendered obsolete. 

It is true that a distinct definition for gig work is required, because the very structure of this occupation is different to that of traditional 9-to-5 work. India's social security architecture, however, has historically relied on the term 'employer,' creating a security gap for workers whose relationship does not fit into the customary model. Hence, a dedicated framework for freelance labour is necessary to determine a route to social security. Simultaneously, while the platform network is contractually a ‘partner’ in the affiliation, it has substantial control over worker wages, incentives, order allocations, and ratings. The ambiguity of the definition can therefore lead to a potential accountability gap, permitting businesses to earn benefits from labour without assuming the full responsibilities traditionally held by employers, leaving workers vulnerable to exploitation from their partner businesses.

Policy Recommendations

1. Portable Corpus Fund

• This paper proposes an effective portable mechanism within the existing Social Security fund that is not linked with a particular platform network.

• Contributions should be recorded against individual workers, rather than being tied to a single platform. This would help workers retain access to benefits even while switching platforms.

• The mechanism could help workers retain access to eligible accident and healthcare provisions when switching platforms. Temporary income support during verified periods of work disruption would require an appropriate benefit under the applicable scheme.

• Access to the benefits should be linked to the worker’s existing e-Shram identification rather than requiring separate verification, allowing the unique social-security number to be active across platforms while simultaneously increasing the documentation of gig workers across the country.

• A precedent for this framework is the ‘Drive the Driver’ initiative, which was launched by Ola in March 2020 in light of the COVID-19 Emergency. Starting with ₹20 crore from the Ola group and its employees,^[9] the campaign aimed to raise up to ₹50 crore in total, with further contributions from investors, citizens and institutions. Co-founder Bhavish Aggarwal pledged a year’s salary to the fund, elucidating how the existence of platform-funded corpuses can prevent businesses and employees from being left stranded during emergencies.

• This scaffolding will delegate responsibilities between the state and institutions and address the deficiency of a stable employer.

• Limitations: Implementing a portable fund would require reliable coordination between platforms and government agencies to prevent contribution gaps and delays in transferring benefits. Furthermore, platform contributions may increase operating costs, making transparent collection and periodic review by the government essential.

2. Mandatory Platform Onboarding

• To equip workers with technological skills such as platform navigation and digital communication, a mandatory onboarding module must be designed that explains incentives, ratings, worker rights, dispute resolution, commissions, etc.

• The Ministry of Labour and Employment should establish national minimum information requirements, while each platform must deliver and record the completion of the module before a worker begins accepting gigs. Platforms must bear the cost of implementation, while the Labour Department of the respective states will audit these completion records. Complaints of non-compliance would be investigated by these departments.

• This module would be understood and acknowledged by each onboarded worker, creating a documented record that the platform has effectively communicated its terms.

• Limitations: Mandatory onboarding may become a formality if workers simply click through the module without understanding it. Short, multilingual modules, accessible explanations, and comprehension checks could improve effectiveness, although these would increase implementation and monitoring costs.

3. Transparent Worker Rating & Appeal Frameworks

• Disclosing the impacts of high or low ratings, including but not limited to order reallocation, effects on incentives, and potential suspension or deactivation of the worker’s account.

• Disclosing what qualifies and contributes towards ratings, including customer complaints, cancellations, or delays.

• Providing an easy-to-use appeal system to provide workers with a right to protest in case of uncontrollable circumstances, such as heavy traffic delays or rain.

• Platforms are required to disclose the criteria for ratings and these appeal procedures in a standardised format established by the Ministry of Labour and Employment. Platforms would bear the cost of maintaining the appeal system and would be required to retain the records of the decisions for regulatory reviews performed by the Labour Department of the respective state government.

• Limitations: The decisions made by the appeal systems must be entirely impartial, while large volumes of complaints may be difficult for the platform to process simultaneously.

4. Commission Ceiling

• Establishing and maintaining a maximum cap on commissions that platforms can deduct from worker earnings, with the rate and additional deductions being disclosed during onboarding.

• Most workers surveyed in the ILO 2024 report said that commission rates rose from 10% to 25–30% per gig (p. 29). While the survey may contain bias, reducing its reliability, addressing standardised national ceilings is crucial to avoid excessive commission rates even in the future. The Motor Vehicle Aggregator Guidelines^[10] (2020, revised 2025) state that the “driver onboarded… shall receive at least 80% of the fare applicable.” The remaining fare is “retained as the Apportioned Fare by the aggregator,” displaying that, where drivers bring their own vehicles, the standard for apportioned fare is less than or equal to 20%.

• To establish a middle ground, this paper proposes a commission ceiling range of 16–19% as a standard. This is set against the precedent laid out by the Motor Vehicle Aggregator Guidelines, of apportioned fare to be less than or equal to 20%.

• This also creates a middle ground between the initial commission rates of 10% and the inflated rates of 25-30%, which were reported by the gig workers in the ILO interview.

• Limitations: A uniform ceiling may disproportionately affect smaller platforms. Platforms could respond by reducing worker incentives or increasing consumer fees. The proposed 16–19% ceiling is therefore a policy proposal requiring consultation with workers, platforms, and regulators, supplemented by cost assessments and impact reviews before implementation.

Gig-worker welfare cannot be comprehensively addressed in isolation. Delivery distances, dark-store locations, and inefficient routing directly influence workers’ time, expenses, and earnings, making urban planning a crucial complement of labour protection.

Pillar II – Urban Planning & Sustainability

In 2016, Professor Carlos Moreno of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University coined the term ‘15-minute city,’ referring to a sustainable urban metropolis where daily necessities (including grocery stores, hospitals, or schools) would be accessible within 15 minutes, either on foot or by bike.^[17] This urbanised configuration would reduce dependence on vehicles and consequently congestion and emissions, leading to an overall decrease in each citizen’s carbon footprint.

The expansion of quick commerce, however, has flipped this concept. Rather than composing cities to bring consumers close to services, platform networks bring goods to residents within a 10-minute proximity, emphasising instancy and increasing dependence on delivery networks. The increasing relevance of these networks in residential areas introduces a new set of challenges surrounding urban strategisation.

Micro-Fulfilment Hubs

Former grocery stores, gyms, and small-scale retail shops are being transformed and packaged into compact yet optimised storage and distribution facilities constructed to fulfil ultra-fast last-mile deliveries.^[11] These stores are referred to as ‘micro-fulfilment hubs,’ commonly dubbed ‘dark-stores’ due to their inaccessibility and closed-off operations from the public eye. To meet the demand for instant delivery, dark-stores need to exist in large quantities and be in proximity to local neighbourhoods.

The purpose of a dark-store is to act as a warehouse and store to dispatch online orders, rather than attending to walk-in customers. However, the expansion of this model leads to the disappearance of convenience stores, which may disproportionately impact lower-income households that do not have the affordability to consistently utilise e-commerce. Crucially, converting shops into spaces closed to the public can have consequences for connectivity and interaction, as potential third places are made inaccessible to residents.

Furthermore, dark-stores create excessive vehicular congestion, as spaces around the main store are utilised for loading delivery vehicles, while the constant flow of delivery bikes to and from streets clogs up residential gateways. Dark-stores also raise food-safety concerns: in August 2026, the Maharashtra Food and Drug Administration (FDA) suspended 14 food business licences after a statewide inspection of establishments that sell through quick-commerce and delivery platforms, finding expired products along with cockroach infestations and rodent droppings.^[12] These gaps in food safety raise serious concerns regarding the prolonged usage of dark-stores and the subsequent health impacts on the general public.

Geolocation Gaps

Perhaps the most overlooked yet significant void that exists in the functions of instant services is India’s unstandardised geolocation structure. According to a research study conducted in 2018, the inefficient, vague Indian addressing system cost the economy anywhere from $10–14 billion a year.^[13] A typical address looks like “House X, Complex Y behind Temple Z”; these locations can be understood by humans, but algorithms require geotags to pinpoint the exact destination. Indian pincodes cover an average area of 179 square kilometres^[13], which can waste time and reduce productivity during last-mile delivery. However, the estimates date from 2018 and relate to broader addressing inefficiencies; they should not be interpreted as current estimates of losses attributed to quick commerce alone.

Last-mile delivery refers to the process where the package moves from a local warehouse to the customer’s doorstep. An estimated 30 to 35% of delivery costs in India were attributed to this final stage in 2018.^[13] Of the $10–14 billion yearly total, the paper attributed $6–8 billion to the logistics industry, through inefficient route planning, last-mile delays and misrouted deliveries.^[13]

Quick commerce relies on speedy delivery times in the last stage of shipment. Poor geocoding can therefore result in misplaced deliveries, increased commute distances, and inefficient routing. A 10-minute economy demands both physical infrastructure and digital apparatus that enable reliable navigation.

The Environmental Cost of Quick Commerce

Lastly, quick commerce creates a complex trade-off that affects environmental sustainability. While dark-stores do encourage multiple deliveries to occur through a single courier, provided locations are in close proximity, the primary model relies on frequent shorter deliveries instead. These deliveries can nullify some environmental benefits associated with electric vehicles and dark-stores due to increased emissions and additional vehicle movement. A 2026 assessment by Vikram Tihal and Dr. Jagat Naryan Giri on sustainable e-commerce in India found that carbon emissions from courier travel are projected to increase by 32% in major Indian cities by 2030 if current trends continue^[14], demonstrating an urgent need for alternatives to fuel-powered vehicles. Furthermore, the paper highlighted that 64%^[14] of surveyed platforms employed redundant routes, which may unnecessarily create congestion while contributing to rising carbon levels in the atmosphere.

Even the gradual electrification of delivery mediums does not fully address the ecological footprint of the quick-commerce model. While electric cargo vans or bikes certainly stabilise emissions compared to regular traditional vehicles, the increased demand for unsustainable production of EVs, coupled with the underlying issue of fragmented deliveries, remains substantial. The same 2026 study further identified that 78% of product packaging consists of single-use plastics, despite the fact that 67% of consumers are willing to use reusable packaging^[14]. This may be due to the smaller dimensions of most products ordered online, which can generate large amounts of non-biodegradable packaging waste, as the mechanism required for efficient waste disposal may be absent at many dark-stores.

Policy Recommendations

Quick commerce is gradually engendering requirements that reshape municipalities into ‘10-minute cities.’ Hence, it is imperative to embed digital commerce into urban policy, rather than considering delivery infrastructure as detached from the city itself.

1. Dark-Store Planning Framework

Existing urban planning and licensing frameworks, such as the Model Building Bye-Laws (2016) and state zoning laws, regulate land usage and commercial activity, but do not yet classify and recognise dark-stores as independent logistical hubs. Furthermore, they do not co-ordinate delivery traffic, loading activities, or neighbourhood impacts.

• Creating an urban planning category for micro-fulfilment hubs, complete with operational requirements.

• Requiring platforms to obtain formal licensing for dark-store operations and assessing proposed public sites using land-use and municipal requirement legislation.

• Examining the area to account for residential areas, road capacity, and pre-existing commercial activity before establishing infrastructure. Establishing particular ‘loading zones’ in back areas to avoid disruption to residents during departure under the licensing permits.

• Conducting half-yearly health inspections of registered dark-stores. Suspending licences for breaches in food safety, followed by checks every two months for stores with a high risk of infestation or decay, subject to existing inspection regulations.

• Monitoring dark-store density within districts and assessing its impacts on land use, loading activity, and local mobility before approving additional micro-fulfilment hubs to avoid over-congestion.

• Limitations: Stricter licensing and density restrictions may limit the availability of suitable sites, particularly in densely populated urban areas where demand for rapid deliveries is highest. If regulations are excessively restrictive, platforms may relocate hubs, compromising the model itself.

2. Last-Mile Delivery Consolidation

• Requiring or incentivising platform networks to consolidate orders from the same dark-store where doing so would not compromise the promised delivery window.

• For appropriate higher-density delivery corridors where four-wheelers justify consolidation, platforms should be encouraged to use electric cargo vans or leased vehicles, while smaller vehicles, including bikes, can be retained for time-sensitive or harder-to-access locations. These costs will be borne by platforms or vehicle-financing partners.

• Limitations: Consolidating orders may conflict with the rapid delivery windows that define quick commerce, particularly when orders contain products requiring different handling. Furthermore, deploying larger vehicles in dense neighbourhoods may create additional road-space pressures, counteracting some of the efficiency gains.

3. Standardised Geocoding & Addressing

• Integrating standardised geolocation systems, such as the DIGIPIN, which the Department of Posts made available for public use in May 2025,^[18] into delivery networks to provide a common digital location reference.

• Establishing a consistent address framework, including flat/unit number, street name, locality, city, and PIN code, that accompanies the DIGIPIN.

• Major delivery and navigation platforms should be required to accept the DIGIPIN alongside conventional addresses, enabling more accurate delivery and routing.

• Limitations: Establishing the standard addressing system and adapting it to all online navigation platforms may be time-consuming and create logistical issues.

4. Sustainable Delivery Standards

• Setting progressive targets to transition usage to electric two-wheelers or low-consumption delivery vehicles. Creating a structured timeline over a defined transition period for platform businesses to adopt sustainable transport methods is ideal.

• Requiring larger platforms to report vehicle activity and delivery kilometres to the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB). The CPCB should work with State Pollution Control Boards to monitor metrics and verify them against reported order volumes.

• Encouraging platforms to optimise delivery routes to reduce emissions, save delivery time, and improve road congestion during shipment.

• Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) and Plastic Waste Management Rules, while regulating plastic packaging and waste, do not account for the intensive, high-volume delivery system of the platform economy. Hence, reducing unnecessary packaging and enforcing deposit-refund systems (which have been successful in European countries)^[14] can facilitate collection and re-usage.

• Limitations: The platform networks and State Pollution Control Boards will need to keep track of extensive data due to the sheer volume of deliveries executed every day. Having quarterly emission reports from businesses may be more effective in ensuring that data is filed and evaluations of business activities are performed in a timely manner.

These infrastructural changes carry economic consequences beyond instant-services themselves. The location of dark-stores and the cost of rapid fulfilment influence the position of local retailers in the market, linking urban sustainability to the question of equitable participation in the digital economy.

Pillar III – Competition & Local Economies

The augmentation of the freelance economy of India has altered the broader commercial landscape and competition, particularly for local retailers. Traditionally, consumers purchased goods from compact neighbourhood stores and forged close relationships with local shop owners, resulting in stronger customer loyalty. Repeated purchases arise from the trust established between the two parties, coupled with proximity and comfort due to the ubiquity of small-scale stores.

However, platform networks have transformed these personal bonds into impersonal transactional relationships with different delivery workers every day. Instant-delivery models are much more time-optimising and comfortable than stepping out each time goods are required, particularly for last-minute purchases. Consequently, kirana stores may be unable to foster customer commitment, meaning that their previously successful business model may quickly be rendered obsolete.

In an interview with TIME Magazine, 35-year-old storeowner Jay Prakash, based in Bangalore, said as much.^[15] Prakash said that his daily earnings had been cut in half, and that older customers who knew the quality of his products still bought from him, “but it’s not the same.” Attracting younger consumers may be far more difficult, as they are not required to explore their surroundings to find quality produce. This individual account illustrates the pressures faced by some retailers but does not establish the overall impact of quick commerce on all kirana stores.

The platform economy, while capable of providing traction towards smaller digital startups, is immensely disadvantageous to businesses with a deficiency of digital visibility. They are physically fixed in a certain location, meaning their customer base is determined through proximity. Digital platforms, in contrast, have access to a wider customer network through delivery services, are discoverable online, and have already embedded digital payment and logistics in their mechanism.

However, the inclusivity and expansion of digital architecture can become a boon for local retailers if implemented with fairness. The most obvious instance demonstrating these benefits is the initiation of the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) in India. Firstly, the basic items required for UPI – a mobile phone and QR scanner – are accessible compared to the more expensive card machines that may be difficult to use. Cashiers or owners are no longer required to physically store currency and have a digital ledger of cash flows, reducing security risks and improving financial documentation, while consumers preferring cash-free payments can still shop at local stores. The UPI is therefore a precedent for the application of digital tools to democratise participation for local merchants in the electronic economy.

Policy Responses

The Open Network for Digital Commerce (ONDC), an innovative endeavour aiming to provide equity for offline retail sellers and kiranas, was launched by the Indian government as a pilot in five cities in April 2022.^[19] The initiative consists of a decentralised platform that creates a network for all buyer apps, seller apps, and logistical providers, however big or small the player may be.

In traditional e-commerce, a singular platform is responsible for coordinating between the parties in a purchase – the consumer, service provider, and courier. In ONDC, however, these functions are separated across participants depending on their category. For example, a consumer may use one buyer application to find and purchase a product, while the seller uses another application to process and manage the orders. Finally, the delivery is executed by a separate company, all without operating on the same platform.

The interconnectedness of ONDC attempts to address the structural disadvantage faced by these local retailers in the digital economy: limited visibility. Integration into this digital network can remove restrictions emerging from physical limitations, without requiring retailers to develop their own independent consumer-facing platforms. This initiative follows a similar logic to the UPI framework: establishing joint, collaborative digital infrastructure that allows simplified interaction and service between clients and suppliers. A particular advantage of the categorisation in this model is that seller commission can be cut by about 80%: restaurants selling through ONDC reportedly pay 3–5% in total fees, compared with 25–30% in commission on Swiggy and Zomato.^[16] This could allow lower prices for consumers.

Policy Gaps

The fundamental oversight of ONDC, however, is that despite access to an open network, there is no mechanism to ensure equal competition between businesses. While the network acts as an accessible pathway for local merchants to enter digital commerce, it does not eliminate the massive resource gap between a national and local business; nor does it discount the scale of advertising, brand recognition, and digital skill that platform businesses possess. Consequently, accessing the same open network does not guarantee receiving comparable visibility or sales. On the other hand, one industry guide suggests that ONDC’s buyer apps are not yet as polished as those of established firms, and that delivery times are less reliable outside the largest cities.^[16]

Policy Recommendations

The policy gaps lie not in the existence of the ONDC mechanism itself, but in the structure of the network.

1. Minimum Service Standards

• ONDC should strengthen the monitoring of existing buyer app mandates by establishing minimum service standards for clear product information, stock availability, order tracking, and easy refunds.

• Along with this, the apps must provide essential customer services to ensure the reliability of the application while replicating the quick, convenient experience provided by traditional platform businesses.

• A standardised mechanism across buyer apps should be devised, where customer grievances are directly reported through the buyer app, automatically forwarded to the suppliers, and finally deliberated upon with the logistical service provider to resolve the issue. However, this mechanism requires rigorous documentation from the network’s side to ensure that data from every purchase is accurately recorded and stored.

• Limitations: Enforcing uniform service standards across independent networks may be difficult. A grievance involving a missing product could require coordination between several parties, creating delays and making it difficult to pinpoint accountability.

2. Digital Onboarding & Training

• Curating government-supported programmes that supplement existing programmes that help retailers manage their inventory and logistics.

• Firstly, providing foundational digital training, including creating an online catalogue, uploading available product stock, accepting and managing digital orders, and coordinating with buyer and delivery platforms, is essential to ensure that kirana storeowners are capable and possess the tools to compete within digital commerce. This training process could be formulated through designed video courses or local workshops.

• Forming a temporary helpdesk that acts as a grievance redressal system for newer businesses in ONDC to ensure the continued efficient participation of local stores.

• This process would be funded and coordinated by the government and delivered by seller networks, while the temporary helpdesk would assist unfamiliar retailers.

• Limitations: Training may not translate into sustained digital participation if kirana owners lack the time, staff, or confidence to manage digital catalogues, inventory, and orders alongside strenuous existing operations.

3. Outcome Measurement

• To identify the specific gap between smaller and larger retailers, it is imperative to gather detailed data regarding the authentic impact of integrating into ONDC for local businesses.

• This could be measured across a range of metrics, such as increased customer acquisition, changes in digital sales, and the number of orders received.

• Regular reports and examination of anonymous aggregate data measured against these indicators would aid policymakers in evaluating the efficacy of ONDC in genuinely improving competition for smaller retailers, rather than just allowing them to participate in the economy.

• Limitations: It is difficult to isolate a business's participation in ONDC as the only cause of improvement in sales or delivery numbers.

4. Ensuring Retailer Visibility

• Strengthen ONDC’s existing criteria for ranking sellers in search results and publish them transparently, including but not limited to price, distance, availability, or ratings. This must be distinguished from unexplained differences in visibility.

• Monitoring whether smaller retailers consistently appear lower in these search results.

• Monitoring and identifying whether larger retailers receive disparate or disproportionate visibility.

• Limitations: Greater visibility for smaller retailers may conflict with the objective of providing consumers with the most relevant options. If rankings are adjusted to ensure smaller retailers appear more prominently, consumers may receive recommendations that do not reflect factors such as price, distance, availability, or ratings, potentially reducing the efficiency of the search system.

Cumulative Policy Recommendations

Although India has introduced several policies that address particular pillars of the instant-service economy, their implementation remains limited due to the fact that the frameworks were not designed around the sector’s rapidly evolving business models. For example, the Code on Social Security (2020) came into force on 21 November 2025,^[20] but no scheme for gig workers had been notified under it by May 2026,^[21] and the Code’s fund for gig workers is not yet operational due to a paucity of collaborative and operational frameworks that can be used by the State and Central governments, a gap this paper aims to fill. The table below consolidates and summarises the policy recommendations and expansions, the gaps each recommendation addresses, and the key stakeholders impacted.

Some immediate measures include improving existing grievance systems, integrating DIGIPIN into delivery networks, and expanding retailer training. Others require further review before implementation, such as the binding commission ceiling and dedicated planning category for dark-stores. The relevant central, state, and municipal authorities should assess their costs, consult affected stakeholders, and coordinate implementation.

Conclusion

The instant-service economy has evolved faster than the institutions governing its effects on workers, urban infrastructure, and local retailers. Without better coordination, unification, and implementation, gaps in worker protection, urban planning, and digital-market access may undermine the benefits of rapid delivery.

India's challenges therefore lie in both accommodating the growth of quick commerce and  governing it effectively. The proposed framework aims to preserve the convenience and economic opportunities while balancing sustainability, speed, and scalability. The effectiveness of instant services will depend on clear-cut responsibilities, reliable implementation, and continued evaluation of the created outcomes.

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