Federalism

A river crosses three states. One wants more water for farms, another needs reliable drinking water, and the third worries that too little flow will reach its wetlands. A rule made only upstream can affect people who had no say in it. But a distant national office may miss important local conditions. Who should decide, and how should disagreement be handled?

Federalism begins with this problem of living together while sharing authority. It combines common government with regional self-government. Its quality depends on both the written distribution of powers and the ways institutions listen, negotiate and remain accountable.

Curriculum: NCERT Class 11 Political Science, Indian Constitution at Work, Chapter 7, “Federalism”, Reprint 2026–27; CBSE Political Science 2026–27. International comparisons and the river-basin workshop extend the core. All practice questions and numerical models are original teaching exercises.

What is federalism?

In a federal arrangement, powers are constitutionally divided between a national government and regional governments. Each has authority in its own sphere, subject to the constitution. Regional government is therefore more than an office carrying out whatever the national government chooses to delegate.

The shared constitutional framework usually specifies who can make which laws, how disagreements are resolved and how the framework can change. India has Union and state governments, a written supreme Constitution and an independent judiciary. It also has a constitutional framework for local government, explored in the next chapter. Local government is not simply another name for a state government.

Regional and national identities can coexist. Being Tamil, Gujarati or Naga does not by itself conflict with being Indian. Federalism seeks institutional room for different needs and histories within common political membership. India has single citizenship; separate state governments do not create separate Indian state citizenships.

Two useful distinctions: autonomy means authority to govern specified matters within the shared system; secession means leaving that political union. Decentralisation is the broader movement of power away from a central point. Federalism is a particular constitutional way of organising shared rule and regional authority, not a label for every administrative delegation.

Predict: a national ministry opens regional offices. Has that alone created a federation?

No. Offices can remain subject to instructions and powers delegated by the same ministry. Ask whether regional governments have their own constitutionally protected authority and political institutions. A building outside the capital does not answer that question.

What was the major reason for the breakup of the erstwhile USSR?

NCERT uses the Soviet example to warn that a federal label cannot compensate for excessive concentration of power and domination of regions. That is a useful constitutional question, but a whole historical collapse should not be reduced to one cause or blamed on diversity itself.

The Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. The US State Department’s historical account describes interacting pressures: political and economic reform, competing leadership, independence movements in republics and the failed August 1991 coup. It is an account written from a US foreign-policy perspective, not the voice of every Soviet citizen. Read it alongside the chapter’s focus on centralisation rather than treating either as a complete explanation.

The transferable lesson is to ask how power is actually exercised. A constitution can call a system federal while political practice leaves regions with little effective voice. Conversely, sharing power requires institutions and trust; merely listing regions does not establish either.

Federalism in the West Indies

CARICOM’s own history distinguishes two projects. The West Indies Federation existed from 1958 to 1962. Later efforts at regional cooperation led to the Caribbean Community and Common Market in 1973. Cooperation among countries is different from creating one federal country. Do not infer from a shared cricket team or the word “Community” that all participating countries have one national parliament, currency and government.

Failure of federalism in Nigeria

This inherited heading needs a qualification: it does not mean Nigeria has ceased to be a federation. Section 2 of the Constitution published by Nigeria’s Senate Committee on Constitution Review identifies a federation of states and a Federal Capital Territory.

NCERT uses Nigeria to examine tensions involving regional identities, political power and oil revenues. The learning question is how overlapping disagreements can make cooperation harder, not whether one ethnic or religious community is responsible for a country’s problems. A constitutional structure and the quality of its operation must be evaluated separately.

Evidence check: what would prove that a federal arrangement works well?

A constitutional label alone is insufficient. Look for evidence about regional participation, implementation of agreed rules, protection of rights, fair handling of disputes and the ability to correct failures. No single statistic or one peaceful year proves that all of these work equally well.

How does the Indian Constitution structure the division of powers between the states and the Centre?

Article 1 describes India as a Union of States. To understand the federal arrangement, examine the powers and safeguards rather than searching for one preferred label. Article 246 and the Seventh Schedule distribute legislative subjects across the Union, State and Concurrent Lists.

• Union List: Parliament has legislative authority over subjects such as defence and foreign affairs. These concern common national responsibilities.
• State List: states normally legislate on subjects such as public health, police and local government, subject to the constitutional framework and relevant qualifications.
• Concurrent List: both Parliament and state legislatures can legislate on subjects such as education. Education’s entry itself is subject to specified Union List entries, so even a familiar example needs its qualification.

Residuary power covers matters outside the listed allocation and belongs to Parliament under Article 248, subject to Article 246A. Avoid assuming that every activity involving a computer becomes one exclusive “cyber” subject: a particular law may engage an existing subject as well as a new technology.

Goods and Services Tax has a special constitutional allocation under Article 246A. Parliament and state legislatures have GST law-making powers within that arrangement; Parliament has exclusive power for GST on supplies in the course of inter-state trade or commerce. It is misleading to squeeze every GST question into an unchanged three-list diagram.

What happens when Concurrent List laws conflict?

Article 254 generally gives the valid parliamentary law priority to the extent of repugnancy. But Article 254(2) provides an important exception: a state law on a Concurrent List matter that conflicts with an earlier parliamentary or existing law can prevail in that state if reserved for the President’s consideration and given assent. Parliament can subsequently legislate to alter that position. “Central law always wins, without exception” loses a material part of the rule.

Try sorting: defence, ordinary public-health administration and education. Which list is the starting point for each?

Defence: Union List. Public health and sanitation: State List. Education: Concurrent List, subject to the Union entries specified in that entry. The list is a starting point for identifying competence; real programmes can involve multiple powers, funding arrangements and applicable laws.

Why is India considered to have federalism with a strong central government?

The framers combined regional authority with substantial Union powers. NCERT connects that choice to maintaining unity after Partition and coordinating social and economic development. Strength at the centre is a feature of the design; it does not make states constitutionally irrelevant.

Parliament and state boundaries

Article 3 allows Parliament to form new states and alter specified areas, boundaries or names through law. A relevant bill requires the President’s recommendation. Where it affects a state’s area, boundary or name, the President refers it to that state legislature for its views within the specified or extended period.

The striking distinction is views, not a constitutional veto. The provision does not require the state legislature’s consent. It also does not authorise officials to redraw boundaries by a casual announcement: the constitutional process and law still matter. Article 4 distinguishes these laws from constitutional amendments under Article 368.

When Parliament can enter a State List field

There are specified routes. Article 249 allows Parliament to legislate on a State List matter following a national-interest resolution in the Rajya Sabha supported by at least two-thirds of members present and voting. Article 250 concerns a Proclamation of Emergency in operation. Article 252 allows legislation for consenting states following the required legislative resolutions; other states can adopt that law later. Article 253 concerns implementing international agreements and decisions.

These routes have different triggers and limits. A general claim that a topic is important is not itself an Article 249 resolution. Under Articles 249–250, special competence and the continuing effect of the resulting laws are also time-conditioned. Learn the mechanism before trying to memorise every exceptional route.

Administration and finance

Articles 256–257 provide for specified Union directions, including ensuring compliance with parliamentary laws and preventing state executive action from impeding Union executive power. They should not be translated into an unlimited power to command every state decision.

All India Services connect Union and state administration through common service arrangements. Their officers work in both settings. Rule 7 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules allows state authorities to institute proceedings in specified circumstances, while dismissal, removal and compulsory retirement as disciplinary penalties require a Central Government order. The blanket assertion that states can never take disciplinary action confuses different powers.

States also have major spending responsibilities, while revenue powers and transfers connect them to the Union. This creates questions of financial autonomy. But states do raise revenues of their own; all their money is not a discretionary gift from the Centre.

Centre-State relations

Three questions organise the relationship: who may make the law, who carries it out, and who pays? These are legislative, administrative and financial relations. A single education programme can involve all three without making them the same power.

The Finance Commission under Article 280 recommends arrangements concerning the sharing of specified tax proceeds and principles for grants, among its constitutional responsibilities. It is a recommending constitutional institution, not an office that personally makes every state spending decision. Distinguish the Union–states share from distribution among states; these answer different questions.

The Planning Commission belongs to the historical discussion. NITI Aayog was established in January 2015 and describes its present role as policy and technical advice and cooperation with states. It should not be presented as the old Planning Commission still controlling state plans. Neither institution is a substitute name for the Finance Commission.

Classroom extension: quasi, cooperative and competitive federalism

CBSE’s 2026–27 annexure introduces these terms as additional classroom reference material and says that this material will not be assessed in the Board examination. They help compare constitutional design with everyday political practice.

• Quasi-federal is a description that emphasises India’s strong Union alongside its federal features. It is a way of analysing the balance of powers, not a provision cancelling states’ constitutional authority.
• Cooperative federalism means governments working together on shared problems: for example, agreeing on evidence and coordinating action across borders. Cooperation does not erase their different constitutional powers.
• Competitive federalism emphasises states comparing performance and trying to improve governance and public services. Improvement is the aim, not an automatic result. Fair comparison needs reliable measures and attention to different starting resources; a ranking does not itself determine constitutional tax shares.

Discover: can cooperation and competition happen together?

Imagine states jointly agreeing how to measure water losses, then comparing progress in reducing them. Setting a common measure is cooperative; trying to improve relative performance is competitive. They can coexist. Ask whether sharing a successful repair method would improve everyone’s service even if it reduced one state’s lead.

A current example of shared machinery: the GST Council

Article 279A brings Union and state representatives into the GST Council, which makes recommendations on specified GST matters. Its constitutional voting rule uses weighted votes: the Union has one-third of the total weight and states together two-thirds; decisions require at least three-fourths of weighted votes of members present and voting. Neither the Union alone nor all states together can reach that threshold alone. This is a voting-design observation, not a claim that every meeting uses a contested vote or that a recommendation automatically becomes a law.

Demands for autonomy by states

Autonomy demands can concern legislative subjects, control of revenue, administrative arrangements or language and culture. These need not be demands to leave India. Ask what power is being requested, why the existing arrangement is considered inadequate and how other people’s rights or interests would be protected.

Party politics affects cooperation. The chapter describes periods of one-party dominance and later coalition bargaining. Treat those as historical patterns, not a guarantee that every future coalition decentralises power or every same-party Union–state relationship is harmonious.

Demands for new states

Changing state boundaries can accommodate demands for language recognition, regional representation or more responsive administration. NCERT traces linguistic reorganisation and later demands connected with regional development and administrative size. A common language can be relevant without being the only consideration: one language need not have one enormous state, and a new boundary does not remove linguistic minorities from either side.

Evaluate a proposal by asking who gains a voice, what happens to services and resources, and how minorities will be protected. A demand for a new state within India differs from secession. Article 3 supplies a constitutional route for change; it does not by itself prove that every proposed division is desirable.

Role of Governors and President’s Rule

A state Governor is appointed by the President under Article 155. Because the office is not elected by the state’s voters and has important constitutional functions, decisions about government formation, bills and reports of constitutional breakdown can become points of conflict. Constitutional judgement must be distinguished from party advantage.

Article 356 applies where a state’s government cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution. The President may act on a Governor’s report or otherwise. The resulting proclamation needs approval from both Houses within the constitutional time limit, ordinarily two months. An approved proclamation ordinarily operates for six months from its issue; further six-month extensions require approval by both Houses, with a general maximum of three years. “Three years automatically” is wrong. Under the general provisions, continuation beyond one year requires both the specified Emergency condition and an Election Commission certification about election difficulties.

The provision does not permit takeover of High Court powers. Its constitutional validity can be judicially examined. A rival party governing a state is not, by that fact alone, a failure of constitutional machinery. Evidence about the actual constitutional situation matters more than political dislike.

Legal update: delays over state bills

Later authority matters. The Supreme Court’s 20 November 2025 opinion on Articles 200–201 explains the Governor’s constitutional options and rejects general judicially prescribed deadlines and the idea of “deemed assent”. It nevertheless recognises a limited court direction to discharge the Governor’s function within a reasonable time in glaring cases of prolonged, unexplained and indefinite inaction.

Do not learn either “a universal three-month deadline” or “every indefinite delay is protected”. The opinion distinguishes the constitutional choice, personal immunity and the limited response to inaction. This is an extension concerning state bills; it should not be automatically applied to every different presidential function.

Inter-state conflicts

States may disagree about boundaries, resources or policies with effects beyond their territory. Border questions can involve language, identity, administration and livelihoods. River disputes can involve drinking water, farms, industry and ecology. Reducing either kind to a quarrel about sentiment misses the people and evidence involved.

Legal adjudication and political negotiation perform different jobs. Article 131 provides a Supreme Court route for specified disputes between governments involving legal rights. Article 262 separately authorises Parliament to provide for inter-state water-dispute adjudication and, by law, exclude the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and other courts over the specified disputes. Therefore, “every water dispute simply goes straight to the Supreme Court” is inaccurate.

Article 263 provides for an Inter-State Council to investigate, discuss and recommend on matters of common interest and coordination. A coordinating council is not the same as a court giving a judgment. A good settlement may require legal clarity, credible measurements, implementation arrangements and continuing cooperation.

River-basin workshop: negotiate with a changing total

Three fictional regions—Headwater, Valley and Delta—share a basin. Use 15 paper tokens as the normal-season supply. The invented minimum is three tokens for each region’s essential use and three reserved for the river ecosystem. These are game rules, not measured water needs, scientific ecological thresholds or legal entitlements.

1. Reserve the ecosystem’s three tokens. Meet the three regions’ stated minimums. How many remain?
2. Let each region propose a use for the remainder. Choose a rule: equal shares, a documented additional need, or another reasoned approach.
3. A dry-season card reduces the total to 11. Keep the original minimums visible. Can an allocation satisfy all four claims?
4. List evidence that might change the model: actual supply, alternative sources, losses, essential needs and environmental requirements. Negotiate a revision and explain who should be heard.

Reveal the arithmetic—and the decision it cannot make

The stated minimums total 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 = 12. Normal supply leaves 15 − 12 = 3 tokens. Dry supply of 11 falls short by one, so no rearrangement can meet every original minimum. Arithmetic exposes the constraint; it does not decide whose claim should change. A serious agreement needs evidence, reasons and a process that hears affected interests.

Now give Headwater first access to all the tokens. Does physical position alone justify taking as much as it wants? Compare power over a resource with a defensible rule for sharing it. Real river systems are more complex than this game; the point is to discover interdependence and accountable negotiation.

Special provisions and different forms of representation

Federalism does not require every state to have exactly the same arrangements. Asymmetry means constitutionally specified differences, which may respond to a region’s history, institutions or needs. It is not an unrestricted permission to ignore equal rights.

For example, Article 371A protects specified matters concerning Naga practices, customary law and land and resources through a requirement for the Nagaland Legislative Assembly’s resolution before relevant parliamentary Acts apply. The protection concerns the listed subjects, not every law. Article 371 provides a different kind of arrangement involving developmental responsibilities in Maharashtra and Gujarat. These provisions should not be collapsed into one identical “special status” for all states.

Representation can also vary. India’s Rajya Sabha represents states with different seat allocations; state representatives are elected by elected members of state assemblies under Article 80. Germany’s Bundesrat uses a different design: members come from the governments of its Länder, which appoint and recall them, and each Land casts its votes as a unit under Articles 50–51 of the Basic Law. Both give regional institutions a place in national decision-making, through different mechanisms.

Myth reveal: must equal respect mean identical constitutional arrangements?

No. A system can recognise different circumstances while remaining one constitutional order. The relevant question is whether a difference has a defensible purpose, clear scope and safeguards. Conversely, calling a measure “special” does not remove the need to examine its effects and constitutional limits.

Jammu and Kashmir

Separate the earlier arrangement from the current one. Article 370 historically provided a special constitutional relationship for Jammu and Kashmir. The 2019 constitutional changes ended that earlier special-status arrangement. The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act created the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh with effect from 31 October 2019.

At the official-source check for this note on 7 September 2026 IST, the Ministry of Home Affairs identifies Jammu and Kashmir as a Union Territory with a legislature and Ladakh as a Union Territory without one. A legislature does not by itself make a territory a state. Do not read the textbook’s description of the former state’s constitution and autonomy as the present arrangement, or treat a political promise of statehood as an enacted change.

This case illustrates why dates and legal status matter in studying federalism. Historical special provisions, constitutional changes and territorial reorganisation are related developments, but they are not interchangeable descriptions of a single legal act. The chapter does not claim that every dispute about these changes is settled by this short explanation.

Why it still matters

Source investigation: consultation, consent or ratification?

Open the official Constitution at Articles 3–4, then Article 368. Make three columns headed “state views”, “state consent” and “state ratification”. For a proposal affecting a state’s boundary under Article 3, identify which expression the Constitution uses and what step follows. Now examine Article 368’s proviso: specified amendments affecting federal arrangements require ratification by the legislatures of at least half the states.

Reveal the distinction

Article 3 requires referral for the affected state legislature’s views under its specified procedure; it does not give that legislature a veto. Article 368 requires ratification by at least half the states for the listed categories of amendment. These are different legal processes. Neither supports the sweeping statement that states must approve every constitutional change or that states never participate in constitutional change.

Compare the two designs. Why might a constitution use consultation for one change and ratification for another? Propose a reason, then identify a cost of that choice. The task is to reason about a constitutional design, not merely select whichever arrangement gives your preferred government more power.

Practice: explain, apply, evaluate

1. How can a strong Union and constitutionally meaningful states coexist?

The Union can hold extensive powers, including specified exceptional routes into state subjects, while states retain constitutional institutions and ordinary authority over their allocated fields. Explain both sides with provisions such as Articles 246 and 249 rather than labelling the entire system federal or unitary from one example.

2. A state asks for more control over revenues and its language policy. Is that necessarily secession?

No. These can be demands for financial and cultural autonomy within the Union. Identify the exact proposal and its constitutional implications before concluding that it seeks independence. Autonomy and secession are different aims.

3. Why is a shared subject not proof that two governments must perform identical tasks?

Concurrent legislative competence concerns authority to make law. Administration, finance and specific programme responsibilities may be arranged separately. One government funding a service does not by itself determine every legal competence or delivery role.

4. A state government belongs to a different party from the Union government. Does that establish a ground for President’s Rule?

No. Article 356 concerns inability to carry on state government in accordance with the Constitution. Party difference alone establishes no such breakdown. The constitutional facts, applicable procedure and judicial scrutiny matter.

5. In the river game, why does adding a neutral mediator not remove the shortage?

A mediator can improve the process but cannot change the stated total: 11 tokens cannot meet minimum claims totalling 12. Participants need reliable evidence and a reasoned revision or additional resources. An institution can improve how a hard choice is made without making the physical constraint disappear.

Revision thread: shared rule and regional authority → constitutional allocation → strong Union with limits → finance and administration → negotiation and legal remedies → asymmetry → cooperation that survives disagreement.

Sources

Checked on 7 September 2026 IST. The constitutional compilation states its own text date of 1 May 2024; later legal and institutional sources are identified separately. Examples explain the chapter without claiming official examination status.

• NCERT, Federalism, Chapter 7 — Reprint 2026–27, printed pages 150–175; chapter scope and debates.
• CBSE Political Science curriculum 2026–27 — Class XI Federalism scope on page 6; additional classroom reference material and its assessment boundary on pages 21–22.
• Legislative Department, Constitution of India, as on 1 May 2024 — Articles 1, 3–4, 80, 155, 246–257, 262–263, 279A–280, 356, 368 and 371–371A; Seventh Schedule.
• Supreme Court opinion of 20 November 2025, 2025 INSC 1333 — concluding discussion and answers on Articles 200–201; limited response to inaction, no general deadlines or deemed assent.
• Ministry of Home Affairs: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh Affairs — current territory/legislature distinction and 31 October 2019 commencement.
• NITI Aayog: objectives and features — constitution in January 2015 and present policy/advisory role.
• Department of Personnel and Training: All India Services disciplinary rules — Rule 7 distinguishes state disciplinary authority in specified circumstances from penalties reserved to Central Government orders.
• US Office of the Historian: collapse of the Soviet Union — historical chronology and interacting political pressures; a US foreign-policy perspective.
• Nigeria Senate Committee on Constitution Review: Chapter 1, Part 1 — federal identity under Section 2.
• CARICOM: history of the Caribbean Community — distinguishes the former federation from later regional cooperation.
• Germany’s Basic Law, official English translation — Articles 50–51 on regional government participation through the Bundesrat.

Key takeaways

• Federalism is a system of government that combines common government with regional self-government, where powers are constitutionally divided between a national government and regional governments.
• In a federal arrangement, each level of government has authority in its own sphere, subject to the constitution.
• Federalism seeks to provide institutional room for different needs and histories within a common political membership, allowing for regional and national identities to coexist.
• The quality of federalism depends on both the written distribution of powers and the ways institutions listen, negotiate, and remain accountable.
• Decentralisation is the broader movement of power away from a central point, but federalism is a particular constitutional way of organising shared rule and regional authority.

Test yourself

What is the main problem that federalism attempts to address?

Federalism begins with the problem of living together while sharing authority, particularly when a decision made by one entity can affect others who had no say in it.

How is power distributed in a federal system?

In a federal arrangement, powers are constitutionally divided between a national government and regional governments, with each having authority in its own sphere, subject to the constitution.

What is the difference between autonomy and secession?

Autonomy means authority to govern specified matters within the shared system, while secession means leaving that political union.

Why did the Soviet Union dissolve in 1991?

The Soviet Union dissolved due to interacting pressures, including political and economic reform, competing leadership, independence movements in republics, and the failed August 1991 coup.

What is the key distinction between federalism and decentralisation?

Federalism is a particular constitutional way of organising shared rule and regional authority, whereas decentralisation is the broader movement of power away from a central point.