The Roots of a Wave: Analyzing the Economic and Cultural Drivers of Right-Wing Populism

Abstract

This paper examines the rise of populism through two distinct lenses: economic and cultural. While populism can be a natural democratic occurrence, there is growing concern among both the public and intellectuals about the centralization of power, the crumbling of faith in institutions, the toxic political cocktail, and the general backsliding of democracy that populist movements often bring. Thus, this paper attempts to analyze the roots of this contemporary populist wave.

Introduction

Populism is often described as a “thin-centered ideology” that thickens when fused with a host ideology, such as right-wing conservatism. The populist right combines advocacy for free markets, cultural conservatism, and the favoring of social hierarchies over egalitarianism with powerful populist rhetoric. By itself, populism is a political style that can lend itself to both the left and the right. The populist right is frequently associated with authoritarianism, such as that of Viktor Orbán of Hungary, and historically has been closely linked to the rise of fascists like Adolf Hitler. Though populism itself is a democratic phenomenon—that is to say, it is a phenomenon exclusively present in democracies—it is often considered a major threat to those same democracies, capable of leading to significant democratic backsliding and regression.

To Elaborate on the Right

The term "right-wing" initially emerged during the French Revolution, when members of the National Assembly were divided between those on the president's right—who supported the Ancien Régime (Old Order)—and those on the left, who supported the revolution. This fundamental division still holds true today. Right-wing policies are characterized by social conservatism, which often includes anti-immigrant, anti-abortion, and anti-communist sentiment while espousing traditional "family" and "cultural" values. A classic example of this is the Republican Party in the U.S. On the economic front, the right typically believes in a laissez-faire economic approach: private property, privatization, deregulation, and limited taxes are all ideological staples.

To Elaborate on Populism

Populism is an anti-establishment, exclusionary rhetoric designed to pit two or more groups against each other. Often invoking the "tyranny of the majority," a term coined by Alexis de Tocqueville, populism is defined by an antagonistic binary worldview: "the people" versus "the elite." The borders and nature of these two groups are often fluid and can shift depending on the context. The homogeneous "people" are portrayed as sovereign, hardworking, honest, and moral, representing the true will of the nation. Meanwhile, the hegemonic "elite" are portrayed as dishonest, immoral, cosmopolitan, corrupt, and a force contributing to the decay of the nation. Right-wing populism often incorporates another layer of antagonism: external threats to the nation, usually framed as immigrants or some form of outsider.

This antagonistic worldview is often capitalized on by charismatic leaders, such as the right-wing populist Javier Milei, president of Argentina. Such a leader claims to capture and represent the authentic will of the people, which often elevates them to a cult-like status. In line with their view on the authenticity and goodness of "the people," populism is skeptical and hostile towards intellectualism and academics, instead supporting what it sees as common-sense truths easily accessible to the masses.

Populist movements indulge in hostility towards traditional institutions, viewing them as tools of the elite that have betrayed the people’s interests. This malice extends to media houses, universities, and even fundamental political institutions like the judiciary and legislature. This phenomenon can take increasingly dangerous forms. The most blatant of these is democratic backsliding; for example, Jair Bolsonaro’s constant illiberal rhetoric about Brazil's supposedly rigged elections in the lead-up to the 2022 election resulted in violent pushback from his supporters (Carothers and Sall). A more subtly pervasive form is the use of alternate media sources to disseminate conspiracy theories posited as authentic truths. For example, the platform Truth Social, utilized by the populist right in the U.S., is a space where conspiracies like the "great replacement theory" are circulated. These alternate media houses are framed as ways of reclaiming power over information and the truth, and they are used by charismatic populist leaders as a direct channel of communication to "the people."

Support for right-wing populists began to swell in the 2000s, catalyzed by the implosion of various miscalculated economic policies that resulted in numerous blunders and crises. All of these events worked to galvanize right-wing populist support. While it is true that we cannot understand support for the populist right without accounting for its economic determinants, the past decade has shown that right-wing populism is a derivative of a plethora of factors. These include a changing digital landscape, powerful cultural factors, and specific political contexts, all centered on a nucleus of perceived disenfranchisement and the resulting marginalization of the supposedly authentic "people."

Economic Determinants

Populist rhetoric is only effective when sown in the fertile fields of discontent. The rise of right-wing populism can be attributed to an increasing feeling of structural marginalization and discontent based on a variety of factors, including economic ones. This discontent and marginalization can result in a loss of faith in the current system—which is a perfect breeding ground for right-wing populism. Right-wing populists amplify economic anxieties to fuel the antagonistic narrative of an elite class "selling out" the nation and betraying the interests of the people.

Populism is often skeptical of globalization. After the end of the post-war consensus in the 1970s, the ushering in of the neoliberal era saw the establishment of several major policies, the most important of which were hyperglobalizationand the pursuit of unlimited growth.

This shift in mindset resulted in the need for a flexible and cheap labor force. The transnational movement of labor increased, while trade unions and labor safety nets were weakened, and automation accelerated. Large industries quickly shifted to areas with cheaper labor or automated production completely. This resulted in high rates of unemployment in low- and middle-skill jobs in the West.

Rising globalization led to an increase in unemployment for domestic workers. As Western economies outsourced these jobs, they transformed into white-collar service economies. These new jobs usually have high barriers to entry, which further marginalized an already disgruntled group of workers. These workers often feel left behind and betrayed by a system that can lead to major economic anxieties, all of which are harvested by the populist right to gain support.

Furthermore, trade agreements and the import of foreign goods—produced through foreign production houses, usually with lower standards of labor than would be accepted domestically—are viewed through a skeptical lens. Barone and Kreuter (2021) added to the repository of literature on the rise of populism by showing that increased exposure to trade shocks increased support for right-wing populism in Italian municipalities. Imports and trade agreements are perceived as the unwanted influence of a foreign power in the domestic affairs of a sovereign people. Dippel et al. (2022) showed that imports from low-wage countries increased support for nationalist parties employing populist rhetoric in Germany between 1987 and 2009. In general, right-wing populists tend to be skeptical of any transnational organization—the best example of this is Britain's exit from the European Union (Brexit). Colantone and Stanig (2018) posited that regional economic insecurities caused by the Chinese import shock led to a surge of 4 percentage points in support for the right-wing populist Brexit movement in the UK. Populists frame transnational organizations as impediments to the will of "the people" and as institutions controlled by the elite, working against the interests of the people. This framing exploits economic insecurities to draw large swaths of support from the economically disenfranchised.

Hyperglobalization eventually exploded with the financial crises of the late 2000s. Such crises work to destabilize institutional integrity, widening the gap between traditional establishments and the common people, as financial crises are seen as avoidable failures caused by the fiscal mismanagement of elites. These elites were often subsequently bailed out by the government, while the common people suffered the consequences with little to no assistance. Blanchard and Fischer (2015) evaluated 20 major financial crises between 1870-2014 and found a 30% surge in far-right party voting.

Financial crises fuel the narrative of a powerful elite wrongfully in control of the nation. They also fuel notions of unfairness, suggesting that the elite are able to cheat the system while the people are left to suffer. All of this culminates in feelings of helplessness, powerlessness, and disenfranchisement. Additionally, the integration of various markets causes a rippling effect when financial crises do hit; they can destabilize supply chains, increase debt, raise unemployment, and crash markets. Algan et al. (2017) support the previous study in stating that crisis-induced economic insecurity is a driving factor of populism and political skepticism, drawing a link between rising unemployment and increased support for populist and fringe parties in 26 European countries between 2000-2016.

Income and wealth inequality are key factors contributing to economic insecurity and the disenfranchisement and marginalization of groups at the lower end of the wealth concentration spectrum. Neoliberalist policies have ensured that, more than ever before, an increasing volume of wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few. According to a 2023 UBS Global Wealth Report, the world’s richest 1 percent owned 47.5 percent of all global wealth, a stark illustration of this concentration.

Another factor contributing to the disenfranchisement of groups who then turned to right-wing populism is a shrinking middle class. Dorn et al. (2020) posited a positive correlation between increased voting for right-wing parties in Germany and rising inequality. As communism drew to an end, capitalism's largest victory was the creation of a large, healthy middle class that lifted millions out of poverty. As neoliberalist policies were allowed to function unchecked, this once-healthy middle class drastically shrunk, with a select few managing to move into the upper classes while most were dragged back down. This is represented best by the increasing concentration of wealth in the hands of a shrinking elite. The once-healthy middle class of the world—specifically in the USA and Europe—was decimated. Pástor and Veronesi (2021) put forth cross-country evidence that populist support is stronger in advanced economies with higher levels of inequality. Additionally, Duca and Saving (2015) drew a relationship in the U.S. between increasing inequality and increasing political polarization. Populists spun this narrative, portraying the hardworking, honest, tax-paying "sovereign people" as being destroyed and their money being unjustly stolen by an undeserving, lazy, corrupt elite class. Feelings of unfairness and helplessness were harvested by right-wing populists to draw support from economically marginalized communities. Wealth and income disparities often play into narratives of the elite being unfairly, undeservingly, and unmeritoriously powerful. Couple this with the anger around the financial crisis of the late 2000s, and the populist formula is clear: a group of undeserving elite are driving the nation into the gutter.

Furthermore, as the neoliberal system works to eliminate social safety nets like healthcare and affordable housing, crime and homelessness rise, and people feel increasingly economically unsafe. High levels of resentment and disenfranchisement, the availability of cheap labor in the global south, and the lack of middle- and low-skill jobs in Western countries meant decreased levels of social mobility. People felt stuck in a system that had betrayed them. A sense of helplessness swept over them. Albers et al. (2022) suggested that individuals with "overly pessimistic beliefs about their relative income position" were more drawn to right-wing populist rhetoric. People believed that the system was broken to an extent where there was no point in trying, as they simply could not overcome economic barriers and achieve upward social mobility. After analyzing regional vote swings towards far-right populists, Protzer (2021) drew a positive correlation with intergenerational mobility, terming it the "most potent correlate" for regional populism in various developed countries. Right-wing populist rhetoric gave them someone to blame. Playing off these feelings, their narratives were easy to understand and fit well, thus drawing massive amounts of support.

Economic Determinants: Not the Full Picture?

Economic determinants are important to consider when analyzing the rise of the populist right. However, they offer a limited perspective on an extremely broad and complex issue. The rise of the populist right is a deeply contextual matter, dependent on historical, political, and cultural factors.

In the USA and Europe, right-wing populism has risen because of a blend of cultural and economic issues, the best example of which is immigration. While white men are indeed experiencing a new wave of insecurity as they lose their social homogeneity due to the advent of pluralist and multiculturalist policies that ensure a wider diversity of races, genders, and sexualities are present in living and work spaces, the issue of immigration is not purely a cultural one. It carries an undertone of economic anxiety stemming from increased job insecurity, competition for housing, and strain on welfare benefits. Thus, it is not always simple to differentiate between what is considered an economic and what is considered a cultural factor. To draw a hard dividing line is dangerous, as it poses the risk of misdiagnosing the very dangerous rise of right-wing populism.

Additionally, there is hard evidence to suggest that the rise of right-wing populism is not solely a derivative of economic determinants. While in the historic 2016 U.S. presidential election, Donald Trump did indeed sweep the Rust Belt and garner massive support among poorer white voters, the populist wave was not carried by this income group alone. "Among the 64% of American voters who earn more than $50,000 a year, 49% chose Trump, and 47% Clinton" (Henley). Furthermore, the paper "Who Voted for Trump in 2016?" (Cook et al.) found Trump’s popularity was at its maximum with voters earning an annual income of more than $100,000. Lastly, the same study examined exit poll results, determining that only 23% of Trump’s white, non-college-educated voters made less than $50,000. Even the economically secure came out in droves in support of Donald Trump. This is further emphasized by the alignment of various affluent figures with Trump, including Elon Musk, David Sacks, and Peter Thiel. Clearly, while economic factors do play a role in drumming up right-wing populist support, it would be a significant error to attribute the phenomenon solely to them.

Cultural Factors

While globalization is a notable economic determinant of right-wing populism, its policies, such as free trade and the relaxed movement of capital, ensured that the wave of globalization would have long-lasting cultural effects. The increased levels of economic immigration from the Global South to the North is a major contributor to cultural anxiety. Additionally, refugee crises like the one in 2015 in Europe are often framed by populist narratives as "influxes" or, in more extreme cases, "infiltrations." Many groups now claim to feel a loss of identity and an undermining of their culture.

Furthermore, while the era of hyperglobalization after the 1970s saw relatively right-wing economic policies—free markets, limited government interference—social policies became increasingly liberal. Massive strides were made towards a more pluralistic and accepting society, including in the areas of women’s rights, homosexuality, gender, and race. Beneath the primary layer of antagonism—"the people" versus "the elite"—there is often an additional layer involving the imposition of cosmopolitan policies. "The people" are framed as the common man, coming from a simple, often rural background, who is extremely hardworking and honest. "The elite" are seen as cosmopolitan city-dwellers who do not understand the life of the common man. Many viewed increasingly socially progressive policies, such as the legalization of homosexual marriage, as the imposition of these cosmopolitan values onto the people. Faced with fast-moving progressive policies in an increasingly dynamic world, groups of people were often left feeling resentment and a sense that their way of life was under threat. Waves of insecurity swept over them as they felt powerless against the world changing around them.

The main vehicle for this insecurity is immigration. This is particularly evident in the insecurity over the ability of immigrants, specifically Muslim migrants, to integrate into European society. Those who believe integration is not possible feel that European values and culture are in conflict with those of the immigrants and, if not protected, will slowly disintegrate. In line with the "us vs. them" narrative, right-wing populists who believe "the people" are a sovereign, culturally homogeneous group drum up these insecurities by portraying migrants as a group favored by the corrupt cosmopolitan elites. Right-wing populism often requires an external threat to rally against. Thus, the view that immigrants are foreign infiltrators is exploited, and rhetoric of a grand "invasion" or "flood" is amplified. This framing inflates these issues and allows the populist right to gather larger support. Rhetoric like this manifests itself in conspiracy theories like the great replacement theory, which posits that the native white population of the U.S. and Europe—"the people"—will soon be replaced by immigrants and people of color, marginalizing the native population and making them a minority. This is a massive cause of cultural anxiety that is exploited by right-wing populists, whose rhetoric clumps all migrants together as inherently bad for the country. Right-wing populist rhetoric has undoubtedly increased the salience of immigration as a political issue, forming a feedback loop where populist leaders amplify the issue, which in turn reinforces their support.

It is true that migrants are often framed as competitors for jobs, benefits, and housing. However, economic insecurity is not the main driving factor for concern over immigration. Immigration anxiety is only weakly rooted in economic concerns. Instead, research consistently finds that anxiety over immigration is deeply rooted in anxiety about identity and the perceived erosion of traditional culture. Furthermore, Margalit (2025) identified ethnocultural estrangement and rural resentment as consistently prevalent and unique drivers among the populist base in several Western democracies, including for Donald Trump voters in the U.S. He also found that voters with cultural and identitarian concerns about immigration and progressive policies are particularly receptive to populist rhetoric across several Western democracies, including the U.S. and UK.

Additionally, there is an undertone of a rural vs. urban dynamic at play. While right-wing populist supporters do occupy large swaths of support in metropolitan cities, they dominate rural areas, often without competition. Populists use rural disenfranchisement—the feeling rural residents have of being looked down upon or disregarded by the cosmopolitan elite, whose policies no longer reflect the interests of the rural population. Within the rural landscape, another anxiety takes root through the breakdown of local community hubs—such as community centers, libraries, and pubs—that contributes to feelings of isolation and loneliness, which can manifest as anger and distrust toward the establishment.

The "cultural backlash" thesis, as posited by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, states that as society moves in the direction of more liberal policies, older, more conservative members may retaliate in an "intergenerational backlash." As the dominance and hegemony of once-dominant demographic groups—predominantly straight, white men—fade and different groups begin to occupy more space in society, these men can be left with a sense of loss and resentment. This subconscious feeling often manifests itself in feelings of betrayal and perceived marginalization by a system they believe no longer serves them. Very simply, the town they once saw filled with people who looked and spoke like them is no longer homogenous. In a rapidly changing world, they may simply want to return to the days when everyone looked like them. This disillusionment is a large contributor to the support of the populist right, whose charismatic leader promises a return of sovereignty. Society's progress towards more liberal values is catapulted by an expansion in higher education (especially for women), increased urbanization (which can often result in a cultural melting pot), and increased ethnic diversity due to immigration. These massive societal changes can push this once-hegemonic group to a "tipping point" where insecurities of a cultural nature begin to pile up, triggering a desire to protect their traditional way of life from what they perceive as threats. This triggers what the authors term an "authoritarian reflex," which translates to support for the populist right. However, scholars like Armin Schäfer dispute this theory, arguing there is a lack of empirical evidence to support the intergenerational backlash claim. Schäfer suggests that populist sentiment can be prevalent among young people as well, and that age is not a strong predictor of populist attitudes.

Conclusion: Cultural or Economic?

It is ultimately impractical to definitively determine whether economic or cultural factors play a larger role in the rise of the populist right. While in the 2015–18 period many populists gained massive support in economically weaker areas—Donald Trump’s support in the U.S. Rust Belt, Brexit’s backing from towns in the Midlands, Marine Le Pen’s votes from France’s deindustrialized areas—all these populists were also supported in droves by disillusioned middle- and upper-class white men, who undoubtedly gave their support to the populist right primarily due to cultural grievances.

Furthermore, as real wages in the U.S. are no longer stagnating as they were during the 2015–18 period, populism hasn't gone away. This is exemplified by the persistent support for Donald Trump in the U.S., which has remained strong through varying economic conditions. While his initial victory occurred during a period of economic recovery, his support base has not significantly eroded during periods of subsequent economic growth, suggesting that economic prosperity alone does not quell populist sentiment.

Conversely, the UK has recently seen a surge in support for the right-wing populist party, Reform UK. The Independentrecently reported on a poll suggesting that "Reform UK would win if a general election were held tomorrow." This fits the inverse relationship between support for right-wing populism and the health of an economy—recently, the UK unemployment rate reached its highest level in four years (Stewart), and the BBC reported that “growth has been sluggish” since the post-recession rebound in 2024 (“How fast is the UK's economy growing and what is GDP?”).

Votes for various right-wing populist parties, especially in Europe, rose drastically at the turn of the 2010s, reached a peak in the 2016–18 period, and now wax and wane around this elevated baseline. The entrenchment of populist support and rhetoric is undoubtedly a result of perceived unaddressed cultural grievances, the best example of this being immigration. Economic crises and the health of the economy may have electoral significance; however, broader support for the populist platform requires continuous dissatisfaction with the cultural fabric of a country.

It is interesting to note that those who support right-wing populism purely based on economic disillusionment may be doing so against their own interests. The populist right is rarely in favor of redistribution policies, welfare programs, free healthcare, or any other measure proven to lift the economically disenfranchised. This is representative of a shift in politics. Previously, political battles were often fought along class lines, where the poor would traditionally side with the left and the middle and upper classes with the right. Politics fought on the basis of culture has flipped that formula on its head. This shift in how politics is fought, from the basis of class to the basis of culture and ethnicity, could suggest that the rise of the populist right is a predominantly cultural phenomenon.

In their paper “Trump, Brexit, and the rise of Populism,” Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2016) directly examine the causes of the rise of populism. Taking into account both the economic perspective—that the rise of the populist right is the result of marginalization caused by globalization—and the cultural backlash thesis, they concluded that “overall cultural values such as support for traditional values and social lifestyles, nationalism, anti-immigration and tough law and order prove strong and consistent predictors of whether Europeans support populist parties. By contrast, the economic indicators, like experience of unemployment, proved less significant and inconsistent.”

Ultimately, the populist right’s continued support and entrenchment in modern politics undoubtedly has to do with a cultural entrenchment. While populists rode the wave of the economic failures of the late 2010s, modern economic blunders are exploited as and when they pop up to muster support. Successful right-wing populist leaders mobilize a broad coalition of disenchanted citizens on a platform that exploits both cultural and economic anxieties to drum up support.

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