Rise of Militarism in Japan (1919-⁠37) | ISC Class 11 History Notes

This note covers the rise of militarism in Japan between 1919 and 1937: the background of Japan's modernisation and the First World War, the causes of military dominance in the 1930s, the key events from the Twenty-One Demands to the Second Sino-Japanese War, the consequences for Japan and the world, a timeline, the different groups involved, how Japanese militarism differed from German and Italian fascism, and answers to exam-style questions.

What was the background to Japan's rise as a great power?

Japan entered the twentieth century as the only non-Western power that had industrialised successfully. After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the country had deliberately copied Western industry, banking, railways and above all military organisation.

The Meiji Constitution of 1889 created a parliament, the Diet, but placed the armed forces directly under the emperor, not under the elected government. This arrangement gave the army and navy a special independence that would matter greatly after 1919.

Japan's victories confirmed its new strength. It defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 to 1895 and Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 to 1905, the first time in modern history that an Asian state had beaten a European great power.

In 1910 it annexed Korea. By 1919 Japan was a member of the victorious Allied side in the First World War, a permanent member of the League of Nations Council, and a partner in the Washington Naval Conference of 1921 to 1922, which limited the size of the world's great navies.

Definition: Militarism is a policy in which a nation's armed forces come to dominate its government and foreign policy, so that military needs and military thinking shape decisions that should belong to civilians.

The 1920s in Japan are often called the era of Taisho democracy, after the emperor Taisho (reigned 1912 to 1926).

Party politics flourished, universal male suffrage was granted in 1925, and Japanese governments cooperated with the League of Nations and with the Western powers.

This liberal decade is the essential background to what followed, because the militarism of the 1930s was a reaction against it.

Why did militarism rise in Japan in the 1930s?

The rise of militarism had several interlocking causes. No single one explains it; the economic, political, social and international pressures reinforced one another, and each worked through the others.

Economic causes

The Great Depression, which began with the Wall Street Crash of October 1929, hit Japan hard. Japan depended on exports of silk and manufactured goods, and world demand collapsed.

Silk prices fell sharply, ruining farmers in the countryside, while urban unemployment rose. Many Japanese came to believe that the Western powers had shut them out of markets and colonies, and that only expansion into Asia could secure raw materials and living space.

The army argued that Manchuria, rich in coal, iron and farmland, was the answer.

Political causes

The party cabinets of the 1920s were widely seen as corrupt and tied to big business. The army and navy, by contrast, were presented as disciplined and patriotic.

Under a rule first made in 1900, relaxed in 1913 and restored in 1936, the army and navy ministers had to be serving officers, so the armed forces could bring down a cabinet by refusing to supply a minister.

The military also answered directly to the emperor, which made civilian control weak. Assassinations of politicians by young officers and right-wing societies intimidated the remaining moderates.

Social and ideological causes

The officer corps was drawn largely from the rural middle class, which suffered most in the Depression. Many young officers believed that politicians and zaibatsu, the great business combines, had betrayed the nation.

Extreme nationalist societies preached loyalty to the emperor, hostility to parliamentary government and a mission to lead Asia against the West.

The army's own ideology of the imperial way combined emperor worship with the idea that Japan had a right and duty to expand.

International causes

Japan felt humiliated by the naval limitations imposed at Washington in 1922, which gave it a smaller ratio of capital ships than Britain or the United States.

The London Naval Treaty of 1930, which extended the limits, was fiercely attacked in Japan as a surrender by the civilian government.

At Paris in 1919 the Western powers rejected Japan's proposal to write a racial equality clause into the Covenant of the League, and the United States Immigration Act of 1924 shut out Japanese immigrants.

Such treatment, and the rise of anti-Japanese feeling in the United States, fed the belief that Japan stood alone.

How the causes worked together

The causes are best understood as a chain rather than a list. The Depression destroyed the prestige of the party cabinets, because those cabinets had promised prosperity through trade and cooperation with the West.

The constitutional independence of the armed forces then gave the disappointed a ready alternative: an institution that claimed to stand above corrupt politics. Nationalist ideology supplied the language of mission, and the naval treaties supplied the grievance.

When the army acted in Manchuria in 1931, it could present its disobedience as patriotism, and the public, taught by patriotic education and controlled newspapers, largely agreed.

Note: A common confusion is to treat the Depression as the only cause. In Japan the economic crisis worked through existing political weaknesses, especially the constitutional independence of the armed forces, which had been built in long before 1929.

How did the army come to dominate the government?

The process was gradual and violent. In September 1931 the Japanese army in Manchuria, acting without the authority of the civilian cabinet, staged the Mukden Incident, blowing up a section of railway and blaming Chinese troops.

Within months the army had occupied all of Manchuria and in 1932 set up the puppet state of Manchukuo. The League of Nations sent the Lytton Commission, which reported in 1932 and condemned Japan's action. Japan's response was to leave the League in March 1933.

At home, the army's success made it a national hero. When Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi was assassinated by naval officers on 15 May 1932, the era of party cabinets effectively ended.

From then on cabinets were formed by coalitions of bureaucrats, soldiers and conservative politicians, with the army's approval essential. On 26 February 1936 a group of young army officers attempted a coup in Tokyo, killing several senior statesmen.

The revolt was crushed, but it strengthened the army's hand: the senior commanders now demanded and received greater influence over national policy.

The February 1936 revolt also pushed the government towards open expansion. In November 1936 Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany, directed against the Soviet Union and international communism.

In July 1937 a clash between Japanese and Chinese troops at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing began the Second Sino-Japanese War, which Japan fought without a formal declaration.

By the end of 1937 Japanese forces had captured Nanjing and committed the atrocities known as the Nanjing Massacre.

Why the cabinet could not stop the army

Three features of the system explain the army's freedom of action. First, under the rule of 1900, restored in 1936, the service ministers had to be serving officers, so a dissatisfied army could wreck any cabinet by refusing to nominate one.

Second, the armed forces answered to the emperor and not to the elected Diet, so an order from the high command carried more weight than a vote in parliament.

Third, the army in the field, and especially the staff officers of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, could act on their own initiative and present the government with a fait accompli.

The Mukden Incident of 1931 is the clearest example: it was planned and carried out by staff officers without cabinet approval, and the cabinet learned of it after the fact.

How the army tightened its grip after 1932

After the assassination of Inukai in 1932, no party leader again formed a cabinet on his own strength. Cabinets were headed by admirals, generals and bureaucrats, and the army's consent became a condition of office.

Censorship tightened, the press was brought under control, and patriotic education in schools presented expansion as a sacred duty. By 1937 the Diet still met, but real power lay with the army, the navy and the emperor's advisers.

The sequence matters for an answer: the army did not seize the state in a single coup; it used a constitution that already gave it a privileged place.

What is the timeline of the rise of militarism in Japan?

How did the different groups in Japan respond to militarism?

The army and navy

The army was the driving force. Its officer corps, drawn largely from the rural middle class, resented the party politicians and the zaibatsu.

Within the army two currents competed: the Imperial Way faction, which wanted a direct imperial restoration and war with the Soviet Union, and the Control faction, which wanted gradual expansion and modernisation under army control.

The Control faction won after the February 1936 revolt, but both currents agreed on expansion abroad and hostility to parliamentary government.

Politicians and the Diet

The party politicians resisted for a time. Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi was shot in 1930 over the London Naval Treaty. Inukai Tsuyoshi was assassinated in 1932. After that, most politicians accommodated the army rather than oppose it.

Some hoped to use the army's popularity for their own ends; others simply feared assassination. By 1937 the Diet had become largely a rubber stamp.

Business and the zaibatsu

The great business combines, such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, had once supported the party governments. Under the Depression and rearmament they profited from military orders and from the development of Manchuria.

They therefore accepted, and in many cases welcomed, the army's dominance. Rearmament from 1931 onwards pulled the economy out of depression.

Workers, farmers and intellectuals

The rural population suffered most in the Depression and many farmers looked to the army for relief. Urban workers had little power once the labour movement was suppressed. Liberal and left-wing intellectuals were silenced by censorship and police action.

Some academics who criticised the army lost their posts. Public opinion, fed by patriotic education and controlled newspapers, largely supported expansion.

How the groups interacted

The responses were not separate stories. The army's popularity among farmers gave it a claim to speak for the nation against the corrupt city politicians. The zaibatsu's profits from rearmament gave the army the industrial base it needed.

The intimidation of politicians by assassination removed the only group with a constitutional platform to resist. Each group's choice made the next group's accommodation easier, and by 1937 opposition had become dangerous as well as futile.

How did Japanese militarism differ from German and Italian fascism?

The comparison shows that Japanese militarism was not a copy of European fascism. It grew out of Japan's own constitutional arrangements and its sense of being a late-arriving great power. The army did not need to seize the state; it already had a privileged place within it.

What sources tell us about the rise of militarism in Japan?

Historians rely on several kinds of evidence. Official documents include the Meiji Constitution of 1889, the records of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921 to 1922 and the London Naval Treaty of 1930, and the reports of the Lytton Commission of 1932.

These show how the constitutional independence of the armed forces and the naval treaties shaped Japanese politics.

Contemporary newspapers and memoirs show the climate of the 1930s. The assassination of Inukai in 1932 and the February 1936 revolt were reported in detail, and the trials of the young officers became public spectacles that won them sympathy.

Diaries of politicians and soldiers reveal how far civilians had lost control by 1937.

Later historical writing, from the 1950s onwards, has debated whether the Depression or the constitutional system was the deeper cause. Some historians stress the army's independence under the Meiji Constitution; others stress the economic crisis after 1929.

The evidence of the Mukden Incident of 1931, planned by staff officers without cabinet approval, supports both readings.

What each kind of source shows

Constitutional and treaty texts show the rules of the game: who could appoint ministers, who commanded the armed forces, and what limits were placed on the navy. They explain why the army could act without the cabinet.

Newspapers, memoirs and trial records show the mood: the sympathy that the assassins of 1932 and 1936 attracted, and the difficulty of speaking against the army.

The records of the League and of the Lytton Commission show how the outside world saw Japan's actions, and how little it was prepared to do about them.

Read together, the sources show a state in which the formal constitution and the informal pressure of violence both pointed the same way.

Draw a flow chart with four boxes on the left: Meiji Constitution of 1889, Great Depression of 1929, weakness of party politics, and nationalist ideology.

Draw arrows from all four into a central box labelled army dominance, and from that box arrows to three outcomes: Manchuria 1931, withdrawal from the League 1933, and the Second Sino-Japanese War 1937.

Going beyond the syllabus

These ideas extend the unit and are not needed for the questions on it.

What were the consequences of Japanese militarism?

The consequences were felt in Japan, in Asia and in the wider world. For Japan, the most important was the destruction of parliamentary government.

By 1937 the Diet still met, but real power lay with the army, the navy and the emperor's advisers.

In 1940 the political parties were dissolved into a single national body, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, and press and education were brought under strict control.

For China, the consequences were catastrophic. The occupation of Manchuria, the war from 1937 and the Nanjing Massacre killed and displaced millions. For the League of Nations, Japan's defiance was a fatal blow.

The League had failed to act against Japan in 1931 to 1933, just as it would fail against Italy in Abyssinia in 1935 to 1936. Collective security was shown to be an empty promise.

For the world, Japanese expansion brought the Pacific closer to war. The United States refused to recognise Manchukuo and began to build up its navy.

Japan's alliance with Germany and Italy, completed by the Tripartite Pact of September 1940, linked the war in Asia to the war in Europe. The road that began at Mukden in 1931 led to Pearl Harbour in December 1941.

Consequences for Japan's economy and society

Rearmament from 1931 onwards pulled the Japanese economy out of depression. Military orders and the development of Manchuria brought profits to the zaibatsu, the great business combines such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, and tied big business to the army.

Farmers who had been ruined by the fall in silk prices found work in the growing war industries.

The price of this recovery was the loss of political freedom: the labour movement was suppressed, liberal and left-wing intellectuals were silenced by censorship and police action, and some academics who criticised the army lost their posts.

Consequences for the League and for collective security

Japan's withdrawal from the League in March 1933 showed that a great power could defy the League and suffer no effective punishment.

The League had sent the Lytton Commission, which reported in 1932 and condemned Japan, but it imposed no effective military or economic sanctions. Italy drew the lesson and invaded Abyssinia in 1935 to 1936.

By the late 1930s the League had lost the confidence of its members, and states relied instead on their own armaments and alliances.

Consequences for Asia and the coming war

The occupation of Manchuria in 1931 to 1932 gave Japan a base on the Asian mainland, rich in coal, iron and farmland.

The Second Sino-Japanese War from July 1937 tied Japan down in a long campaign in China and pushed it towards a wider war in the Pacific.

The Anti-Comintern Pact of November 1936 and the Tripartite Pact of September 1940 linked Japan to Germany and Italy, so that the conflicts in Asia and Europe became one war.

The attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941 was the culmination of the course begun at Mukden in September 1931.

Glossary

• Militarism: A policy in which the armed forces dominate the government and foreign policy of a state.
• Meiji Restoration: The 1868 political change that ended the shogunate and began Japan's rapid modernisation.
• Diet: The Japanese parliament created by the Meiji Constitution of 1889.
• Zaibatsu: Large Japanese family business combines, such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, that dominated industry and finance.
• Manchukuo: The puppet state set up by Japan in Manchuria in 1932.
• Mukden Incident: The staged railway explosion of September 1931 used by the Japanese army to justify occupying Manchuria.
• Lytton Commission: The League of Nations inquiry of 1932 that condemned Japan's seizure of Manchuria.
• Anti-Comintern Pact: The 1936 agreement between Japan and Germany directed against the Soviet Union and communism.
• Imperial Way faction: The group of army officers who wanted direct imperial rule and war with the Soviet Union.
• Control faction: The rival army group that favoured gradual expansion and modernisation under army control.
• Tripartite Pact: The September 1940 alliance of Japan, Germany and Italy.
• Collective security: The principle that states act together to punish aggression, the basis of the League of Nations.

Common errors and misconceptions

• Misconception: Japan had a fascist dictator like Hitler or Mussolini. Correct: Power was shared among the army, the navy and the emperor's advisers; there was no single ruling leader.
• Misconception: The Great Depression alone caused Japanese militarism. Correct: The Depression worked through long-standing constitutional weaknesses that gave the armed forces independence.
• Misconception: The Mukden Incident was a genuine Chinese attack. Correct: It was staged by Japanese staff officers without cabinet approval.
• Misconception: Japan left the League of Nations in 1931. Correct: Japan left in March 1933, after the Lytton Commission condemned its actions.
• Misconception: The February 1936 revolt succeeded. Correct: It was crushed, but it strengthened the army's influence over government.
• Misconception: Japanese expansion began with the Second World War. Correct: It began with the Twenty-One Demands of 1915 and the occupation of Manchuria in 1931.
• Misconception: The zaibatsu opposed the army. Correct: They profited from rearmament and Manchurian development and largely accepted army dominance.

Exam-style questions with model answers

Q1. State any two reasons for the rise of militarism in Japan in the 1930s. [2 marks]

1. The Great Depression after 1929 ruined Japanese farmers and exporters, and many came to believe that expansion into Manchuria was the only way to secure raw materials and markets.
2. The Meiji Constitution of 1889 placed the armed forces under the emperor rather than the cabinet, so the army could bring down a government and act without civilian approval.

Q2. What was the Mukden Incident of September 1931 and why was it important? [3 marks]

1. Japanese army officers in Manchuria blew up a section of railway near Mukden and blamed Chinese troops.
2. Using this as a pretext, the army occupied all of Manchuria and in 1932 set up the puppet state of Manchukuo.
3. It showed that the army could act without the civilian cabinet, and it led to the Lytton Commission and Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933.

Q3. Explain how the Meiji system and the weakness of party government helped the army to rise in the 1930s. [4 marks]

1. The Meiji Constitution of 1889 placed the army and navy under the emperor, not under the elected cabinet, so the high command did not have to obey civilian ministers.
2. A rule first made in 1900, and restored in 1936, required the army and navy ministers to be serving officers, so the services could bring down a cabinet by refusing to name a minister.
3. The party cabinets of the 1920s were widely seen as corrupt and tied to the zaibatsu, so they lost public respect when the Depression struck after 1929.
4. The shooting of Prime Minister Hamaguchi in 1930 and the assassination of Inukai in 1932 frightened the remaining moderates, and after 1932 no party leader formed a cabinet.

Q4. Distinguish between the Imperial Way faction and the Control faction in the Japanese army. [4 marks]

1. The Imperial Way faction wanted a direct imperial restoration and a war with the Soviet Union.
2. The Control faction wanted gradual expansion and modernisation under army control.
3. The Imperial Way faction was associated with the young officers who attempted the coup of 26 February 1936.
4. The revolt was crushed and the Control faction gained the upper hand, though both currents agreed on expansion abroad.

Q5. Examine the economic and international reasons for the rise of militarism in Japan in the 1930s. [5 marks]

1. The Great Depression after 1929 collapsed world demand for Japanese silk and manufactured goods, ruining farmers and raising urban unemployment.
2. Many Japanese came to believe that Western tariffs had shut them out of markets, and that only expansion into Asia could secure raw materials and markets.
3. Manchuria, rich in coal, iron and farmland, was presented by the army as the answer to Japan's economic crisis.
4. The Washington Naval Conference of 1921 to 1922 gave Japan a smaller ratio of capital ships than Britain or the United States, and the London Naval Treaty of 1930 was attacked as a surrender by the civilian government.
5. The rejection of Japan's racial equality clause at Paris in 1919 and the American Immigration Act of 1924, which shut out Japanese immigrants, fed the belief that Japan stood alone against a hostile West.

Q6. How did Japanese militarism differ from German and Italian fascism? [5 marks]

1. Japan had no single dictator; power was shared among the army, the navy and the emperor's advisers, whereas Germany and Italy had charismatic leaders in Hitler and Mussolini.
2. Japan had no mass fascist party in power; the existing parties were absorbed rather than led by a single movement.
3. Japanese ideology centred on emperor worship and a mission to lead Asia, while German and Italian fascism centred on racial nationalism and, in Germany, anti-Semitism.
4. The basis of army power was the Meiji Constitution of 1889, not a party militia or a coup against the state.
5. Japanese expansion was directed at China and Southeast Asia, while German and Italian expansion was directed at Europe and the Soviet Union.

Key takeaways

• Japan was the only non-Western great power by 1919, having industrialised after 1868 and defeated China and Russia.
• The Meiji Constitution of 1889 gave the armed forces independence from the cabinet, a weakness that mattered greatly after 1929.
• The Great Depression ruined silk farmers and exporters and made expansion into Manchuria seem the only answer.
• The Mukden Incident of September 1931 was staged by army officers in Manchuria without the approval of the civilian cabinet.
• Japan set up the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932 and left the League of Nations in March 1933.
• The assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi in 1932 effectively ended the era of party cabinets in Japan.
• The February 1936 revolt was crushed, but it strengthened the army's control over national policy.
• Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany in November 1936, directed against the Soviet Union.
• The Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 1937 began the Second Sino-Japanese War, fought without a formal declaration.
• Japanese militarism was not a copy of European fascism; it grew out of Japan's own constitution and sense of grievance.

Test yourself

In which year did Japan leave the League of Nations?

Japan left the League of Nations in March 1933, after the Lytton Commission condemned its seizure of Manchuria.

What was Manchukuo?

Manchukuo was the puppet state set up by Japan in Manchuria in 1932, after the occupation that followed the Mukden Incident of 1931.

Who was assassinated on 15 May 1932?

Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi was assassinated by naval officers on 15 May 1932, which effectively ended the era of party cabinets.

What was the Anti-Comintern Pact?

The Anti-Comintern Pact was signed by Japan and Germany in November 1936. It was directed against the Soviet Union and international communism.

Which incident began the Second Sino-Japanese War?

The Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 1937, a clash between Japanese and Chinese troops near Beijing, began the Second Sino-Japanese War.

Why did the Washington Naval Conference of 1921 to 1922 anger many Japanese?

It limited Japan's capital ships to a smaller ratio than Britain or the United States, which many Japanese saw as a humiliation.

What was the February 1936 revolt?

A group of young army officers attempted a coup in Tokyo on 26 February 1936, killing several senior statesmen. It was crushed but strengthened the army's influence.